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ABSTRACT 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the impacts of bank capital on bank 
profitability and riskiness around the period of financial crisis. The study applies fixed-
effects panel regressions and uses bank-level data for 15 European countries over the 
period 2005-2011. The study also investigates this relationship for different bank 
categories (commercial, cooperative and other banks) as well as bank size (small, 
medium and large banks).  
 
Overall, there is a significant and positive relationship between capital and bank 
profitability before and after the subprime crisis; however, no relationship is detected 
between them during financial crisis. In addition, there is strong empirical evidence that 
banks with higher capital level have lower return volatility and higher financial stability, 
especially prior to and after the crisis. Besides, there are two important conclusions 
reached after considering the capital effects in different bank categories and sizes. First, 
bank capital has the strongest positive impact on profitability of cooperative banks, 
followed by commercial banks and other banks. Second, large banks have the highest 
effect of capital on stability and earnings risk; meanwhile the risk of small banks is least 
impacted by capital level. 
 
KEYWORDS: Bank capital, bank profitability, bank risk, financial crisis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent global financial crisis led to negative consequences and contributed 
significantly to recent global recession and European sovereign debt crisis. Since then 
there have been several debates raised to discuss about the causes for recent collapse of 
large financial institutions and a succession of banking crises in the United State and the 
European region. One of them was believed to be liquidity shortfall. Since there were 
over lending activities in banking system, however, banks did not establish a proper risk 
management and adequate capital provisions to absorb the losses resulting from their 
risky businesses. Therefore, global regulators are in process of imposing new capital 
requirements with intention to increase capital level and improve its quality to help 
banking firms survive in the liquidity crisis. Not until now bank capital has been raised 
its important role in the banking system as a cushion to absorb bank’s losses to keep 
banks avoid becoming insolvent or being bailout with public funds. In addition, the key 
role of bank capital served as a buffer against unexpected losses is also recognized by 
Berger and Udell (1994). They also imply further that as the higher uncertainties are, the 
larger bank capital is raised. Moreover, Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995) also state the 
aim of requiring capital from regulators and other uninsured creditors of banks is to 
protect themselves against the costs of financial distress, agency problems, and the 
reduction in market discipline caused by the safety net. According to Berger et al. 
(1995), all government actions designed to enhance the safety and soundness of the 
banking system other than the regulation and enforcement of capital requirements.  
 
Furthermore, in response to recent global financial crisis, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) suggests updating the guidelines for capital and banking 
regulations. Basel III proposes many new capital, leverage and liquidity standards to 
strengthen regulation, supervision, and risk management in the banking sector. The 
capital standard and new capital buffers will require banks to hold more capital and a 
higher quality of capital than under current Basel II rules. The European Union has 
already implemented the Basel II accord via the EU Capital Requirements Directives, 
and many European banks have already reported their capital adequacy ratios according 
to the new system. All credit institutions in the EU adopted Basel II at the beginning of 
2008. 
 
Theoretically, raising capital is costly for the banks because the amount of capital 
affects the return for the equity holders of the banks. Additionally, bank managers 
respond negatively to the request of improving bank capitalization. Their reason is that 
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such regulation restricts their investment opportunities, which will reduce bank 
profitability and lead to ultimate banking failure (Koehn & Santomero 1980). Besides, 
the issue related to the effect of bank capital on bank performance has been discussed in 
several empirical studies. As documented by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), higher 
capital mechanically implies a higher probability of survival. They also indicated that 
there is a positive association between bank capital and its profitability, meaning the 
higher capital could enhance return on equity. However, the theories on the disciplining 
role of demandable debt suggest that banks with high level of leverage (low capital 
level) would have better loan quality; thereby they are less likely to default and being 
acquired (Calomiris and Kahn 1991).  
 
In addition, the relationship between capital and risk has recently become a cause for 
concern. Previous studies focusing on the association between capital and risk have 
mixed results. Some studies find positive relationship between capital and risk, namely 
regulators encourage banks to increase their capital commensurably with the amount of 
risk taken, which refers to “regulatory hypothesis” (Berger 1995). When investigating 
the effect of bank capital on bank’s risk-taking, Furlong and Keeley (1989) argue that 
increasing the required capital level would reduce the incentive for banks to increase 
portfolio risk levels due to reducing the value of the deposit insurance put option. 
Consequently, this relationship implies that more stringent capital will reduce moral 
hazard and the probability of bank failure. Nevertheless, a negative relationship between 
capital and risk may refer to the “moral hazard hypothesis” whereby banks gave 
incentives to exploit existing flat deposit insurance schemes. Van Roy (2005) shows 
that the prudent capital regulation stimulates banks to raise their capital reserves; 
thereby declining their credit risk. Therefore, it can be inferred from Van Roy’s finding 
that there is a negative relationship between raising banks’ capital adequacy and their 
risk, as a result higher capital reserves driving the banks out of insolvent situation. 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
This study examines the effects of bank capital on the bank’s profitability and riskiness 
around financial crisis period with empirical evidences in European region from 2005-
2011. This analysis intends to determine whether higher bank capital level can help 
enhance the level of profitability but reduce risk exposure that banks take around the 
crisis. Moreover, this paper will identify and empirically examine several observable 
bank characteristics that may be effective indicators of a bank’s susceptibility to the 
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financial crisis. The empirical testing is conducted using data on all types of banks 
(commercial banks, cooperative banks and other financial institutions) operating in 15 
European countries spanning from 2005-2011. Bank-specific data are obtained from the 
BankScope databases that include the balance sheet, income statement as well as key 
financial ratios of researched European banks. Other factors relating to country specific 
data such as GDP growth rate, inflation rate, unemployment rate and ratio of public 
debt-to-GDP as well as factors relating to financial market specific-indicators such as 
banking concentration level are collected from World Bank database. The seven-year 
period provides an appropriate time frame for the investigation since it covers the two-
year period of the subprime lending crisis (2007-2008). This period is categorized by 
turmoil in financial markets due to shortfall of liquidity supply resulting in substantial 
losses in banks’ capital. Therefore, the research period allows a thorough robustness 
analysis covering pre-crisis (2005-2006), during crisis (2007-2008) and post-crisis 
period (2009-2011). 
 
This paper intentionally contributes to existing empirical analyses in several ways. First, 
the existing literatures have drawn a lot of attention on US or European cases in several 
periods, though the empirical evidences under the impacts of recent financial crisis have 
not earned enough discussions. Thus the purpose of this study is to examine European 
banks with the latest and wider range of panel data in 15 EU countries from 2005-2011. 
Second, most academic studies usually investigate the impact of bank capital on bank 
risk or bank earnings solely and in individual country like the United States, Japan or 
Canada. Whilst this study focuses on testing the effect of bank capital on different 
important factors of bank activities regarding to bank profitability, and bank risk during 
the period of financial crisis in European region. Third, this study classifies full sample 
into sub-panels according to bank’s size and then considers the effects of different 
factors on the relationship between bank capital, profitability and risk. Fourth, previous 
research usually samples commercial banks and hardly considers other specializations. 
This paper examines overall banking system, including commercial banks, cooperative 
banks and other bank’s categories since banks of different ownership characteristics 
differ in their attitudes to managing capital, profitability and risks.  
1.2 Structure of the Study 
The first chapter provides background information on the topic and introduces purposes 
and potential contributions of this study. The second chapter presents the previous 
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researches relevant to this paper which are the main theories and empirical evidence 
underlying the relationship between the bank capital and bank performance as well as 
bank risk. The third chapter provides a generic background about the European banking 
system before and during the financial crisis. In addition, next chapter explains the 
concept and measurement method relating to bank capital, bank performance and bank 
risk. Chapter five and six present the empirical part of the paper. The empirical 
hypothesis, data and methodology used in the study are presented in chapter five. In 
addition, the research problem is specified more closely by forming hypotheses based 
on previous research and theoretical considerations. The empirical results of this study 
are presented and discussed in chapter six. The chapter seven concludes the paper with 
some general conclusions.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The aim of this chapter is to briefly and critically review the previous empirical research 
in the area relating to association between bank capital and different dimensions of bank 
performance. Even though there have been remarkable empirical evidences about bank 
capital and bank performance in different individual countries, there are few researches 
covered the period before and during financial crisis in European region. Besides, most 
of these studies have focused on only one dimension of bank performance such as either 
of bank’s profitability, bank resilience or bank’s risk taking; they seldom are researched 
in different dimensions at the same time. This chapter begins with the reviewing mixed 
results about the relationship between bank capital and bank performance. Then the 
previous literature on how banks capital affects bank’s risk taking will be summarized.  
2.1 Bank Capital and Bank Performance 
Berger and Bouwman (2013) examine the effects of bank capital on three dimensions of 
bank performance such as probability of survival, profitability and market share during 
normal and crisis time in the United States. The data used in their studies include all 
banks in the United States from 1984:Q1 to 2009:Q4, which covers two banking crises 
and three market crises in the period of 25 years. Their empirical results support the 
hypothesis that higher pre-crisis capital increases the probability of bank survival and 
their market share for banks of all sizes during banking crises. In addition, capital also 
increases profitability for all but medium-size bank during crisis. Another, noticeable 
finding is that small banks benefit in all respects from higher capital during market 
crises and normal time as well. For large and medium banks, higher capital improves 
only profitability during market crises and only market share during normal time. 
 
Altunbas, Carbo, Gardener and Molyneux (2007) investigate the relationship between 
capital, risk and efficiency for a large sample of European banks between 1992 and 
2000. They use data on banks operating in 15 European countries with bank-specific 
data obtained from the BankScope database. They adopt Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) approach, which allows for simultaneity between bank’s risk, capital 
and efficiency while also controlling for important other bank and country-specific 
factors. Their empirical evidence shows a negative association between bank capital and 
risk in inefficient European banks, meaning that they hold more capital and take less 
risk, which is opposite to the evidence in the United States. In addition, another finding 
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shows the positive relationship between risk on level of capital and liquidity, possibly 
indicating regulators’ preference for capital as a means of restricting risk-taking 
activities. Moreover, according to their empirical results, there are no major differences 
in the relationship between capital, risk and efficiency for different bank specification 
such as commercial, saving banks but cooperative banks. 
 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) investigate the bank characteristics contributing to the poor 
performance of banks during the credit crisis. Their empirical hypothesis tests whether 
the banks’ specific factors before crisis related to their poor performance during crisis. 
Their study focuses on sample of 164 large financial institutions across the world with 
assets in excess of $10 billion at the end of 2006, excluding non-public traded banks 
during period from July 2007 to December 2008. They use bank’s buy-and-hold stock 
returns to measure the bank performance. The empirical results show that large banks 
with more Tier 1 capital, more deposits, and less funding fragility will perform better. In 
addition, it is documented in their study that the performance of large banks during the 
crisis is negatively related to their performance in 2006. Besides, there is no systematic 
evidence that stronger regulation lead to better performance of banks during crisis; 
however, banks from countries that imposed more restrictions on banks in 2006 perform 
better during the crisis. 
 
Akhigbe, Madura and Marciniak (2012) examine the relationship between the bank 
capital level prior to the 2007-2009 financial crises, and the exposure of bank stock 
price and stock volatility during the crisis. Their sample consists of 288 U.S publicly 
traded banks with their financial statements consistently available during the period 
from 2005 to December 2008. They use the bank’s buy-and-hold return over the 
financial crisis (from April 2007 to December 2008) as a measure of stock price 
performance. They apply the weighted least squares model to determine whether the 
stock price performance during the crisis is related to several indicators such as bank 
capital, bank size, proportion of marketable securities to assets, ratio of loan loss 
provision to total assets, concentration in real estate loans, banks’ growth opportunities, 
etc. Their most important finding is that banks with a higher level of capital experience 
greater shocks during the financial crisis. Furthermore, banks that are more profitable 
and experienced strong upward stock price momentum before the crisis are more 
resilient to shocks during the crisis. 
 
In addition, Avery and Berger (1990) provide an empirical analysis of new 1992 bank 
standard of risk-based capital, using bank data in the US from 1982 to 1989.  This new 
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RBC standards indicates some bank activities which are inherently more risky than 
others should be capitalized at higher level. They investigate the relationship between 
future bank performance and the risk-based capital relative risk-weights. Their 
empirical method is regressing five bank performance measures such as bank failure, 
nonperforming loan, charge-offs and earnings level as well as earnings variability on the 
lagged proportions of bank portfolios in each of the risk categories defined by the RBC 
standard. Their results show that banks with higher ratios of risk-weighted assets have 
poorer predicted performance. Besides, similar tests of the informational value of 
different capital standards suggest that both old and new capital standards have 
independent information in predicting future bank performance problems. 
 
Furthermore, the role of capital as a buffer to absorb shocks to earnings has been 
recognized in several studies (e.g. Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche 2010; 
Berger and Udell 1994). It is documented that higher capital increases the probability of 
the bank’s survival. In addition, there is another set of theories that focuses on the 
incentive effects of capital. According to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), higher bank 
capital induces higher levels of borrower monitoring by the bank, thereby reducing the 
probability of default or otherwise improving the bank’s survival. In contrast, a different 
strand of the theoretical literature suggests that banks with higher capital may 
experience lower survival probability. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) show that a capital 
structure with sufficiently lower equity leads to more effective monitoring of bank 
managers by informed depositors and hence a smaller likelihood of bad investment 
decisions. This suggests that a bank with higher capital may face a higher probability of 
bad loans and hence loan default, which may result in a lower survival probability.  
 
Several papers examine the association between the bank capital and the bank liquidity. 
Horvath, Seidler and Weil (2012) provide an empirical research of the relation between 
capital and liquidity creation. They use data for all Czech banks during the period from 
2000 to 2010 and adopt Granger-causality framework to test their empirical hypotheses. 
Their results indicate that capital negatively Granger-causes liquidity creation for small 
banks. This finding implies that Basel III Accords might lead to reduced liquidity 
creation by introducing tighter capital requirements; also greater liquidity creation may 
hamper bank solvency. In addition, they also observe that liquidity creation Granger-
cause a reduction in capital. Briefly, the paper refers a trade-off relationship between the 
benefits of financial stability induced by stronger capital requirements and the benefits 
of increased liquidity creation. 
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The previous researches offer conflicting predictions about how capital should affect 
bank profitability. According to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), high bank capital 
increases the total surplus generated in the bank-borrower relationship. Assuming that 
banks keep a large enough portion of the surplus, higher capital will lead to higher bank 
profitability. Moreover, if the ratio of the surplus generated by high- versus low-capital 
banks is higher during crises, it follows that high capital banks will be able to improve 
their profitability during crises relative to low-capital banks. Likewise, Berger (1995) 
examines the capital-earnings relationship by employing annual data from 1983-1989 of 
every insured U.S commercial banks. They run the regression of the capital-asset ratio 
(CAR) and after-tax return on equity (ROE) on three years of lag CAR and ROE and a 
number of control variables, including dummies for every bank and time period in the 
sample. Their empirical evidences suggest that there is a strong positive relationship 
between capital and earnings for the U.S banks in the 1980s and that each variable 
positively Granger-causes the other. Consequently, show that higher capital is followed 
by higher earnings over the next few years. Besides, the finding supports the expected 
bankruptcy cost by implying: (1) the earnings increased following the a capital increase 
comes mainly from reduced interest rates on uninsured funds and (2) Granger-causality 
is the strongest for riskiest banks, who stand to get the most reduction in risk and thus 
the most increase in earnings from raising capital.  
 
Goddard, Liu, Molyneux and Wilson (2010) examine the determinants and convergence 
of bank profitability in eight European Union member countries from 1992-2007, using 
dynamic panel model. The sample includes all commercial, savings and cooperative 
banks from each of the eight countries. Each of estimation is carried out for the entire 
sample period and for two sub periods: (1) 1992-1998 the period immediately following 
the creation of the Single Market and (2) 1999-2007 the period immediately following 
of introduction of the single currency. The key finding is that the persistence of EU 
bank profitability was lower in 1992-2007 than it was in 1992-1998 in all eight 
countries. Also, an increase in the speed at which any excess profits earned in the short 
run were eliminated through competition through competition suggests there was an 
increase in the intensity of competition. Average profitability was higher for banks that 
were strongly capitalized, cost efficient and highly diversified. 
 
Lee and Hsieh (2013) investigate the impacts of bank capital on profitability and risk by 
adopting the Generalized Method of Moments technique for dynamic panels using 
bank-level data for 42 Asian countries over the period from 1994 to 2008. They 
examine the overall banking system, including commercial banks, cooperative banks, 
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investment banks and others. Also, they adopt four proxies for profitability: return on 
assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), net interest margin (NIM) and net interest 
revenue against average assets (NR) and three for risk: variance of ROA, variance of 
ROW and loan loss reserves (LLR) in order to find out the proxy for profitability and 
risk that is suitable for Asian countries. The empirical results indicate that the effect of 
increasing bank capital on profit (risk) is significantly positive (negative). It is also 
found that different profitability variables have different results on the persistence of 
profit. In addition, other noticeable empirical evidences are highlighted that investment 
banks the lowest and positive capital effect on profitability, whereas commercial banks 
reveal the highest reverse capital effect on risk. Besides, banks in low-income countries 
have a higher capital effect on profitability; banks in lower-middle income countries 
have the highest reserves capital effect on risk, while banks in high-income countries 
have the lowest values. 
2.2 Bank Capital and Bank Risk 
The majority of previous papers find a positive relationship between capital and risk 
adjustments, indicating that the banks which have built up higher capital, 
simultaneously also increased risk. Furlong and Keeley (1989) examine the relationship 
between the capital requirement levels with the bank’s risk-taking behavior. They 
document that more stringent capital decreases the incentives for a value-maximizing 
bank to increase portfolio risk, thereby reducing the probability of bank failure. The 
reason is stated that the higher required capital reduces the value of the deposit 
insurance put option. In addition, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) state that there is a positive 
relationship between bank capital and bank risk under the actions of regulators and 
supervisors. According to this regulatory hypothesis regulators encourage banks to 
increase their capital commensurably with the amount of risk taken. Another motive of 
increasing capital when the amount of risk rises argued by Berger (1995) is partly due to 
efficient market monitoring from markets when capital positions are deemed 
inadequate. Furthermore, Blum (1998) also suggests that capital requirement may 
increase the bank's risk in a dynamic framework. The reason is that when raising the 
capital reserves today, the bank has fewer resources to generate profit for tomorrow. 
Therefore when raising equity is very costly, the bank has to involve in riskier business 
today to get higher profitability. 
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Jokipii and Milne (2011) examine the relationship between short-term capital buffer and 
portfolio risk adjustments. They use an unbalanced panel of US bank holding company 
(BHC) and commercial bank balance sheet data from 1986-2006. Their estimations 
show that the management of short term adjustments in capital and risk are dependent 
on the size of buffer. For banks with capital buffer approaching the minimum 
requirement, the relationship between adjustments in risk and capital are negative. That 
is the low capital banks either increase their buffer by reducing their risk or gamble for 
resurrection by taking more risk as a means to rebuild the buffer. In contrast, the 
relationship between capital and risk adjustment for well capitalized is positive, 
indicating that they maintain their target capital level by increasing (decreasing) risk 
when capital increase (decrease). Besides, their results also show that small buffer banks 
adjust to their target capital level faster than their better capitalized counterparts. 
 
Rime (2001) examines the Swiss banks’ capital and risk behavior. The author adopts a 
simultaneous equation approach to analyze adjustments in risk and capital by Swiss 
banks as they approach the minimum regulatory capital level. The sample includes 4 big 
banks, 24 cantonal banks and 125 regional banks in existence from 1989 to 1995, which 
represents 82% of total assets in the Swiss banking system. He estimates the system of 
equations using a three-stage least squared procedure in order to take account of the 
simultaneity of banks’ adjustments in capital and risk to get estimates that are 
asymptotically more efficient than under two-stage least squares. The empirical 
evidences show that Swiss banks close to the minimum regulatory capital requirements 
tend to increase their ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. Moreover, another 
remarkable finding is that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
changes in risk and changes in the ratio of capital to total assets but no significant 
relationship between changes in risk and changes in the ratio of capital to risk-weighted 
assets. 
 
Konishi and Yasuda (2004) empirically investigate the relationship between bank risk 
and some quantifiable factors that may affect bank risk taking behavior at the 
commercial banks. They use panel data of Japanese regional banks covering the period 
from 1990 to 1999. The sample banks include 54 regional banks listed on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE). They use five alternative capital market risk measures: total 
risk, firm-specific risk, systematic risk, market risk and interest rate risk. Also the 
insolvency risk measure is used as Z-score, a statistic indicating the probability of 
bankruptcy. The empirical results show that the implementation of the capital adequacy 
requirements reduces risk taking at the commercial banks as desires of regulatory 
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authorities. An alternative interpretation may be that the collapse of the bubble economy 
in late 1980s and the subsequent bad loans problem completely change the risk taking 
behavior of banks, since banks are more resilient to taking more risky assets. 
 
Baselga-Pascual, Trujillo-Ponce and Cardone-Riportella (2013) analyze empirically 
bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank risk for a large sample of 
commercial banks operating in the European Union using a dynamic panel data. They 
use sample of 155 commercial banks operating in 14 European countries over the period 
from 2005-2011, which consider the impact of on-going financial and economic crisis 
on the Eurozone banking system. They adopt the generalized method of moment 
(GMM) estimator in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. 
They proxy bank risk using two complementary metrics: Non-performing loans rate 
(credit risk) and Z-score (bank risk). Their empirical evidences indicate that 
capitalization, profitability and efficiency and liquidity are negatively and significant 
related to banks risk. In addition, less competitive market, lower interest rate, higher 
inflation rates and falling GDP increase bank risk. 
 
Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) provide a theoretical framework to investigate the 
relationship between a bank’s capitalization and risk-taking behavior by incorporating 
the incentives of the deposit insurer, the shareholder and the manager. The deposit 
insurer who is interested in protecting the deposit insurance fund has the most 
conservative policy toward risk-taking. The shareholder who benefits from risk shifting 
associated with deposit insurance subsidy has an incentive to increase the risk level 
beyond its optimal level. The manager who stands to lose his private benefits of control 
in case of bankruptcy is generally more conservative in determine asset risk than the 
shareholders. In addition, it is shown that a bank’s risk can be either negatively or 
positively related to capitalization, depending on the relative force of the three in 
determining assets risk and risk-turn characteristics of bank’s assets choice set. 
 
Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2007) study the effect of ownership structure on 
performance and risk in the European banking industry with a sample of 181 large 
banks during the 1999-2004 periods. They compare the performance within mutual 
banks (MBs), privately-owned stock banks (POBs), and government-owned banks 
(GOBs) in terms of profitability, cost efficiency and risk, controlling for ownership 
concentration. They proxy ratio of operating profit total earnings assets, ratio of 
operating income to total earnings assets and ratio of operating cost to total earnings 
assets as bank performance measurement. They also incorporate dummies variables for 
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ownership structure characteristics, year and countries. Also, a set of control variables 
such as the size, level of loan and deposit as well as liquidity and capital of banks is also 
included in the model. Their findings indicate that private banks are more profitable 
than both mutual and public sector banks. In addition, as far as profit is concerned, 
bank’s size, loans, capital and loan loss all exhibit significantly positive coefficient, 
while both bank’s liquidity and deposits are not significant. Their results concerning 
risk indicate that public sector banks have poorer loan quality and higher insolvency 
risk than other types of banks. In addition, mutual banks have better loan quality and 
lower assets risk than both private and public sector banks. 
 
Bessler and Kurmann (2014) investigate the relationship of different bank risk exposure 
in different economic environments under different bank capital regulations. Their 
sample consists of commercial banks in the EMU and the US between 1990 and 2011, 
which allows them to identify structural changes of risk exposures and their relative 
importance in the context of the pronounced changes in worldwide banking markets as 
well as the recent financial and sovereign debt crisis. In order to explain the commercial 
bank stock returns in the worlds’ major banking sectors of the EMU and the US, they 
implement a multi-factor asset pricing framework. They focus on the ability of 
macroeconomic factors such as interest-rate risk, exchange rate risk, credit risk, 
sovereign risk and real estate risk to explain stock returns. Moreover, they utilize 
balance sheet characteristics to allow for detailed inferences on the determinants of 
banks’ risk factor loadings and variance shares. The empirical findings indicate that 
banks’ risk factors are multi-dimensional but well-reflected in stock prices. Sub-period 
analyses point towards the existence of pronounced time-variation in betas and variance 
shares. Changes in the banking business and in the crisis period are reflected in the form 
of dynamic risk exposures. Moreover, bank specific characteristics such as asset size 
and equity-to-asset ratios provide relevant information for identifying banks with 
economically significant exposures. Their results yield valuable implication into the 
dynamics underlying bank risk, the associated exposures and their reflection in equity 
prices. 
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3. GENERIC BACKGROUND 
 
During the last decade, the European banking sector witnessed substantial changes as a 
result of regulatory developments, merger and acquisitions (M&As) wave, and 
increasing industry concentration. The regulatory environment was constantly changing 
with implementation of the Financial Sector Action Plan (FSAP), finalization of Basel 
II framework, as well as launching the Capital Requirement Directives (CRD) and the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) which boosted the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the financial sector. Additionally, in order to improve efficiency and 
profitability, there was common trend in the EU banking’s sector that was trying to 
penetrate into new market and increasing their products range, leading to 
consolidations, mergers and acquisitions. Besides, there was widespread diversification 
of generating revenue into area such as insurance, pensions, mutual funds and various 
securities-related areas. Moreover, the creation of single financial market and the 
introduction of the Euro led to converged interest rates and market structures of member 
countries. Thus, this chapter is to provide generic background about the structural 
developments that took place in Western Europe from 2005-2011, elaborating on the 
general regulatory developments related to banking sector, as well as on the 
development in banking structures. The materials used in this section include the text 
book The Economics of Money, Banking and Finance of Howells and Bain (1998), 
Introduction to Banking of Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2006), The Banking Crisis 
Handbook of Gregoriou (2010), Modern Banking of Heffernan (2005), and Annual 
Report on EU Banking Structure of European Central Bank (ECB) from 2004-2011. 
3.1 Regulatory Development 
According to Casu et al (2006:353), the primary objective of EU legislation has been to 
reduce the barriers to cross-border trade in the banking and financial services area in 
order to promote a more competitive and dynamic financial services industry. The 
liberalization of structural obstacles has been accompanied by financial deregulation 
through the reduction of direct government control. At the same time it has been 
associated with upgrades of prudential regulations as witnessed by the revision of Basel 
II rules. Table 1 shows the main regulatory measures that have had an impact on the 
European banking sector 
17 
 
Table 1: Regulatory measures affecting EU banking and financial sectors  
 
 
During the period from 2005 to 2011, there were various legal initiatives relating to the 
banking sector completed, which aimed at advancing the creation of a dynamic, 
competitive and efficient market for financial services in Europe. Since May 1999 the 
Council launched the Financial Sector Action Plan (FSAP) including actions and 
measures. They were set to develop the legislative and non-legislative framework with 
the purpose of creating a single EU wholesale market, making retail insurance markets 
Year  Regulation 
1977 Fist Banking Directive. Harmonized rules for bank licensing. Established EU-
wide supervisor arrangements 
1988 Basel Capital Adequacy 
Regulation (Basel I). 
Minimum capital adequacy requirement for banks (8% 
ratio). Capital definition: Tier 1 (equity); Tier 2 (near-
equity). Risk-weighting based on credit risk for bank 
business 
1988 Directive on Liberalization of 
Capital Flows 
Free cross-border capital flows, with safeguard for 
countries with balance payments problems 
1989 Second Banking Directive. Single EU banking license. Principles of home country 
control and mutual recognition  
1992 Large Exposures Directive. Bank should not commit more than 25% of their own 
funds to a single investment. Total resources allocated to 
a single investment should not exceed 800% of own 
funds. 
1993 Investment Services Directive. Legislative framework for investment firms and 
securities markets, providing for a single passport for 
investment services. 
1994 Directive on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes 
Minimum guaranteed investor protection in the event of 
bank failure. 
1999 Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) 
Legislative framework for the Single Market in financial 
services 
2000 Consolidated Banking Directive Consolidation of previous banking regulation 
2000 Directive on e-money Access by non-credit institution to the business of e-
money issuance 
2001 Directive on Reorganization and 
Winding up of credit institution 
Recognition throughout EU of reorganization measures 
proceedings by the home state of an EU credit institution 
2001 Regulation on the European 
Company Statute 
Standard rules for company formation throughout the EU 
2004 New EU takeover Directive Common framework for cross-border takeover bids 
2006-
2008 
Capital Requirement Directive Update Basel I. Improve consistency of capital 
regulation Make regulatory capital more risk sensitive.  
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open and secure as well as strengthening the rules on prudential supervision for an 
optimal single financial market. (Casu et al. 2006:353). 
 
In 2004 and early 2005, the most significant regulatory developments were the 
finalizations of the Basel II framework, the introduction of new International Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and the revision of some existing International Accounting Standards 
(IAS). Basel II is considered more risk-sensitive than the existing rules (Basel I) 
because they allocate the more capital for lower quality loan than that of the better loan 
quality. Therefore, this new framework gives banks an incentive to achieve higher 
efficiency by improving their risk management systems. Besides, the adoption of the 
IFRS and corporate governance resolutions were to address the need of improving 
transparency as well as strengthening investor confidence and promoting market 
discipline. (ECB 2004-2005) 
 
From 2006 to 2007, there were two initiatives implemented namely Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD) adopted in June 2006 and the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) executed in November 2007. Both the CRD and MiFID 
were supposed to enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of the financial sector. 
The CRD provides incentives for banking firms to improve their risk management 
systems to meet the capital requirements. In addition, it also includes provisions for 
cooperation between home and host supervision for the cross-border institutions. 
Besides, the MiFID provides regulatory tools for the investment firm by extending the 
range of services and activities that they can offer and improve clarity to the allocation 
of responsibilities between the home and host authorities, and promotes investor 
protection. (ECB 2006-2007) 
 
In the period from 2008-2009, due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, there 
was a significant loss of confidence in financial markets and institutions. Thus the 
government and central banks at the international level have to provide appropriate legal 
actions to support the financial system. In order to address the shortcomings caused by 
crisis, in the EU, a European Systematic Risk Board (ESRB) is established with the 
purpose of forecasting the stability of the financial system. Besides, a European System 
of Financial Supervision (EFFFS) also is set up to increase supervisory convergence and 
cooperation in the supervision of individual institution. Additionally, the European 
Commission amends the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). The amendments 
include higher capital requirements for trading book and re-securitization, remuneration 
policies and the disclosure of securitization. Besides, the Directive on the deposit 
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guarantee schemes was amended in March 2009, following a commitment made by the 
EU Finance Ministers in October 2008. (ECB 2010) 
3.2 Consolidation 
According to Casu et al. (2006:347), the consolidation, integration and 
internationalization are important factors that affect the structure of the European 
banking system. The domestic consolidation is preferred due to the fact that it helps 
domestic banking firms reduce costs and complications in merger and acquisition 
operation. Besides, there is a comparative advantage for the domestic banks in 
consolidating locally that they can gain stronger national presence and become more 
competitive in a cross-country consolidation phase. The consolidation trend has resulted 
in the number of credit institution in the EU declining since 1997, and dropped by a 
further 2.8% in 2004. This suggests that consolidation is proceeding in a decelerating 
pace. This decline can be explained mainly by a slowdown in domestic M&A activity.  
 
Besides, Casu et al. (2006:349) also states that merger and acquisition activities 
emphasize more on cross-border markets in recent years because the domestic markets 
become neutral and competition intervention from authorities. In particularly, cross-
border M&A increased relative to the period 1993-1998, both in absolute and relative 
terms, accounting for about 30% of the number and 24% of the value of all deals in the 
more recent period, up from 20% in the earlier period. According to Casu et al. 
(2006:41), there are some common motives for M&As such as economies of scales, 
economies of scope and eliminating inefficiency. Merger and acquisitions can help 
combined institutions to increase their size with being capable of achieving lower unit 
cost of producing financial services. In addition, they can generate cost savings from 
delivering services jointly through the same organization rather than through specialized 
providers. Moreover, banks with poor management are naturally targets for being taken 
over by other institutions with more efficient management. Other motives can include 
increasing market power through removal of a competitor and political power 
enhancement; and diversification of product lines and improvement of marketing and 
distribution. These potential gains will likely produce higher margins and improve the 
profitability and value of the combined institutions. 
 
Consolidation in the banking sector continued in 2006-2007 at deceleration rate, 
meanwhile there was an increasing exception of cross-border deals compared to 
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previous years. Whereas the number of credit institutions declined, total assets of the 
EU banking sector increased, signaling the emergence of larger institutions. However, 
the value of M&A transactions in the first half of 2007 increased and a number of 
significant deals are currently in progress. In the Euro area the number of credit 
institutions declined by 1.9% to 6,130 in 2006, with Netherlands, Denmark and France 
once again being the main drivers of this trend. While Denmark, France and the UK 
continued to witness a consolidation process, a sharp decline in the number of credit 
institutions in the Netherlands during 2007. In the first half of 2008 the number of 
M&A transaction remained at the same level as in the same period of the previous year, 
while their value was significantly affected by the acquisition of ABN Ambro by the 
consortium of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Fortis and Santander. (ECB 2007) 
 
Consolidation process of the EU banking sector continued in 2008 and 2009, leading the 
number of credit institution declined at a steady pace, with an exception of a 
reclassification in Ireland in 2009. Besides, the decline was particularly marked in 
Cyprus, as a consequence of the consolidation of its credit cooperatives sector. There 
was also a declining trend taking place in Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. However, the Baltic countries witnessed an increase trend in both domestic 
and foreign banks. Overall, the number of M&As in the EU dropped by a quarter in 
2008, bringing the total number to the lowest point throughout the period under 
observation (see figure 1). In terms of the total value of transactions, the M&A data 
revealed a significant decline in EU cross-border and outward transactions. By contrast, 
M&A activity started to pick up in 2009, with the clearest increase taking place in the 
sub-category of domestic deals. The values of the deals have remained modest (see 
figure 2). Important deals in 2009 and early 2010 include the acquisitions of Dresdner 
Bank by Commerzbank and HBOS by Lloyds TSB as domestic deals, but also Fortis by 
BNP Paribas as an example of a cross border deal and Mellon United National Bank by 
Banco Sabadell as an example of an outward deal. Most of these deals were accelerated 
or included by the financial crisis. (ECB 2010) 
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Overall, the cross-border M&A activity is expected to recover quickly once the 
economic cycle turns. Thus, the observed decline in cross-border and outward M&A is 
only temporary. There are three reasons behind this expecting trend. First, the number 
of cross-border deals has already picked up since early 2009. Second, there was an exit 
Figure 1: Bank M&As - number of transactions in EU during 2000-2010 (ECB 
2010:15) 
Figure 2: Bank M&As - value of transactions in EU during 2000 - 2010 (ECB 2010:16) 
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from government recapitalization measures, which result in more M&A opportunities in 
Europe in the near future. Third an ESCB survey conducted in May 2009 revealed that 
bank have temporarily delayed their plan of revising their internationalization strategies. 
3.3 Funding and Capital Structure 
In terms of funding structure in EU banking sector, it is observed that there are 
significant differences from one bank to another. Two determinants factors are the 
bank’s country of residence and its specialization. Firstly, banks’ resource to deposit 
financing differs across countries. Deposit funding is especially important in the new 
member states and Greece (up to 80% of total liabilities), while in Denmark, Ireland and 
France, deposits account for less than 30% of total liabilities. These variations in banks’ 
overall funding structure may result from differences in banking system structure, the 
size and development of the local financial market, the legislative environment, and 
finally the proportion foreign ownership. Another structural factor that may differ across 
counties is household saving levels differ from one country to another. In countries 
where saving levels are high, customers demand for deposits is likely to be higher. 
However, households’ investment preferences also play an important role. While 
households in some countries mainly invest in deposit, households in other countries 
may prefer non-bank financial products, such as mutual funds and life insurance 
contracts. 
 
Another source of funding is non-deposit funding (excluding equity and other liabilities 
mainly related to banks’ financial market activities), which accounted for around 42% 
of banks’ total liabilities between 2000 and 2005. Three important non-deposit funding 
sources are interbank funding, money and capital market funding and securitization. 
The first important non-deposit funding channel is banks’ borrowing on the interbank 
market. Through this market, banks with excess funds can transfer them to banks 
experiencing a funding deficit. As a result, liquidity is redistributed among banks. It is 
clear that interbank transaction mainly serve short-term funding needs, to insure against 
short-term liquidity shocks. Consequently, these positions are rather volatile over time. 
Bank can also turn to non-bank financial market participants to obtain funding. They 
traditionally issue large range of money and capital market instruments such as: 
certificates of deposit, medium-term notes floating rate notes, commercial paper and 
other types of bonds, characterized by a wide range of currencies, maturities and interest 
rates. The use of market instruments allows banks to diversify their funding base and 
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may bring funding more in line with the assets’ characteristics. Another instrument that 
plays a role in banks’ funding strategies and has grown considerably in recent year is 
securitization. There are many reasons for originators to securitize their assets, ranging 
from liquidity to capital adequacy reasons, and in practice banks often pursue a 
combination of benefits. It may be an efficient and cheap source of funding, as these 
bonds may achieve a higher credit rating than the banks’ conventional bonds because 
they are segregated in tranches according to credit quality. Securitization also allows 
issuers to diversify their financing sources, bringing them more in line with the 
characteristics of their assets. Finally, it helps originators to remove assets from their 
balance sheet and thus, essentially to sell their exposure and release the regulatory 
capital assigned to it. 
 
The financial crisis highlighted the weaknesses of the internal funding policies of the 
financial industry. Drawing on the lessons of 2008 and 2009, banks and public 
authorities will reshape the funding characteristics of the sector. Banks will be forced to 
improve their funding and capital structures in terms of quality and reliability, however, 
this structural adjustment will also translate into higher funding costs. The amount of 
capital that banks hold will increase, whether as a result of regulatory reforms or of 
capital markets’ demands. Regulatory reforms aim to increase the amount and quality of 
capital that banks have to hold; also the crisis has increased investors’ awareness of 
banks’ capital endowments. Greater awareness is to be found not only among equity 
investors, but also among debt holders, as higher capital buffers also reduce the risk of a 
bank defaulting on its debts.  
 
Besides, both regulatory developments and the current economic and financial 
environment will affect the capital structure of banks. The expected increase in cost of 
risk will continue to consume bank capital in the near future, and the supervisory 
requirements relating to risk weights on a wider range of assets classes will probably be 
permanently higher for the foreseeable future. EU banks have already raised their Tier 1 
and capital adequacy ratios by roughly 2 percentage points. However, future 
developments are likely to be affected by two factors: first the ability to tap markets will 
differ between banks, and second governments are now important shareholders in the 
banking sector of some EU countries. In the period preceding the crisis, the funding of 
banks was characterized by low interest rates, low risk and thus an inadequate pricing of 
cost of risk. Wholesale and interbank sources of funding had continuously grown in 
importance, whereas funding through deposits was considered unattractive. 
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Before the crisis, some banks were becoming increasingly dependent on cheaper short-
term interbank and wholesale funding, increasing the maturity mismatched in the 
balance sheet. In a crisis and post-crisis environment, where banks are likely to look for 
safety, funding sources such as repo funding, simple forms of securitization and covered 
bonds may become preferred choices. A shift towards secured funding has been 
observed since 2000 and may become a persistent trend in the medium term. Over the 
coming 5 years, lenders to banks will attempt to limit credit and funding risks and 
therefore demand greater security and be more aware of the liquidity of collateral 
provided. Therefore, although the crisis highlighted the flaws of securitization, analysts 
and market participants agree that securitization will again need to become a part of the 
financial landscape but the exact nature and size of the market is as yet undetermined. 
There are currently some signs of the reopening of the primary and secondary 
securitization market, even if most of the issuance is in fact retained for repo operations. 
Owing to the existence of a large number of uncertainties, the future state of the 
securitization market is still unclear. One probable trend is the development of amore 
standardized market, in terms of both instruments and documentation.  
 
The regulatory proposal on liquidity requirement may have an impact on the role of the 
interbank markets as a funding source for banks. The recent regulatory proposal on 
liquidity requires banks to hold highly liquid assets and an amount of stable funding. 
Figure 3: Capital ratios of EU banks from 2004 - 2009 (ECB 2010:29) 
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Therefore, it is expected that in order to meet the net stable funding ratio requirements, 
banks would have to increase the duration of their funding. This in turn would lead to an 
increased multi-year demand for term liabilities for the banking system. Given that 
banks have to fund themselves at longer maturities, market participants see potential 
difficulties in finding providers of this medium-term funding, as even banks with a 
liquidity surplus under the current regime would have an incentive to invest these funds 
in highly liquid assets rather than in interbank assets. Additionally, regarding the 
liquidity coverage ratio, market participants find the definition of the high-quality liquid 
assets in the BCBS proposal restrictive. As such, banks may be tempted to use the less 
liquid assets as collateral for operations with central banks and to keep other assets 
(eligible for buffer) to meet the supervisory requirements. The assets pledged to central 
banks would not be used as collateral in the secured funding markets. This could also 
weaken repo markets for covered bonds. 
 
In the post crisis period, funding will not be as easily accessible as before the crisis and 
it will be more expensive. Funding structures will move towards stable and long-term 
sources, such as capital and deposits, and away from more volatile and short-term 
sources in the interbank and money markets. Banks will also have to increase their 
capital. As a consequence, not only the median costs of capital and bond issues but also 
the dispersion between banks will increase: investors will discriminate more between 
solid and less solid banks. The price of all sources of funding, including capital, is likely 
to increase. Deposits are being rediscovered as a funding source. This will result in 
higher cost of higher costs of deposit funding owing to increased competition spilling 
into higher interest rates offered. Funding on interbank and money markets will be more 
expensive owing to higher requirements regarding the quality of collateral and the 
pricing of liquidity risks. Generally, risk will be more sensitive to the idiosyncratic risks 
of banks. The Basel III proposals for improvements in capital and liquidity 
endowments, the withdrawals of state support and the expiry of unconventional central 
bank policy measurements will create additional pressure on banks’ funding. Many 
banks will have to issue securities to offset their maturing debt. They will probably try 
replacing some maturing debt with new longer-term debt, which exposes them to 
increase in interest rates and funding costs. This could be main concern in the near 
future, with a possible steepening of yield curve. Wholesale funding costs are also likely 
to increase as a result of a possible congestion of the market. 
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3.4 Recent Banking Crisis 
Economists of a monetarist persuasion employ a narrowed definition of financial crisis 
as they argue that a financial crisis is normally associated with a banking crisis and 
when the stability of the banking system is threatened, the financial infrastructure could 
collapse in the absence of central bank  intervention (Heffernan 2005:407). The collapse 
of a key financial firm normally prompts runs on the banks: customer panic, unable to 
distinguish between healthy and problem banks withdraw their deposits. Fractional 
reserves lending results in multiple contraction of deposit once the run begins. In the 
absence of central bank intervention, providing liquidity to solvent but illiquid banks, 
healthy banks are also threatened because of declines in their asset values in the rush to 
become more liquid. Other definition of financial crisis comes from the literate was 
summarized as the banking sector is often identified as a source of the problem. Banks 
take on increasing amounts of risk by lending to firms and households, which use the 
loan to finance purchases in assets such as properties, equities, etc. Increasingly the 
purchases are made for speculative purposes. As the proportion of short-term debt 
finance rises, the risk increases. An agent triggers a fall in value of these assets and 
increasingly borrowers find they are unable to repay the banks. Banks have typically 
accepted the assets as collateral, thus they encounter the problems as their ratio of non-
performing loan to total loans begin to rise. With lower profit prospects, the share price 
begins to fall and the capital is depleting. Depositors become concerned and in the 
absence of adequate deposit insurance, move their funds to safe investments. If this 
transfer is sufficiently widespread, the bank would collapse. (Heffernan 2005:410) 
 
However, according to Sarby and Okongwu (2009), the current crisis started in the 
housing sector, unlike other financial crisis in recent history. The crisis originated from 
the so-called subprime crisis in the United States that spilled over to many other 
countries (Sanders 2008). Central banks all around the world tried to fuel the financial 
system by creating capital liquidity and by lowering the interest rates. In the figure 4, 
the opposing trends in housing prices and cost of credit during the period 2000 to 2005 
shows that the increasing in housing price and the decline in the cost of credit made the 
prospect of getting mortgage seem less risky since the option of refinancing or selling 
the house were both viewed as viable. This led to a surge in subprime and other types of 
mortgage origination and securitizations. In addition, the mortgage loans had been 
bundled to so-called asset-backed securities (ABS) and sold to banks all over the world. 
The buying banks usually refinanced the purchased of these financial instruments by 
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issuing revolving bonds with short maturities. When the real estate market crisis in the 
US revealed that the underlying loans were uncollectible, the issued bonds also lost in 
value. As maturities were short, the respective banks faced massive liquidity problems. 
With the bond market collapsing, banks had to refinance the redemption of the matured 
bonds by other means than issuing new bonds. With many banks facing similar liquidity 
problems, it got, however, nearly impossible to obtain funds from other sources such as 
interbank market. Securitization of the mortgages thus made a regional crisis in the real 
estate sector a global crisis of the financial system. (Gregoriou 2010:153) 
 
The banking and financial markets crisis mainly originated from the US. As defaults 
increased massively mortgage loans had to be depreciated. This affected not only the 
banks that directly conferred the loans but also a large number of other institutes. In the 
first wave, European banks were hit by the financial crisis mainly because of their role 
as ABS investors and sponsors of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs. 
Many European banks had invested heavily in the US subprime market. As delinquency 
rate started to rapidly increase in 2007, market prices for RMBS tranches tumbled and 
banks were forced to write off significant portions of their RMBS investments. While 
Figure 4: Low cost credit and rising house prices (Sarby and Okongwu 2009) 
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ABCP programs have originally been designed to securitize constant income streams 
such as leasing receivables, they have in recent years been increasingly used to 
refinance long-term assets with cheaper short term debt. European banks were 
subsequently hit by a second wave of losses when the financial crisis started spreading 
to the real economy. With more and more workers being forced out of employment, 
mortgage delinquency rates have been rising throughout Europe. Economies that have 
suffered the most from a housing price bubble have been hit particularly hard with rapid 
drops in house price leading to rising loss ratios for mortgages in default. The impact of 
the wave in Continental European markets has however, been considered stronger, has 
affected financial institutions more swiftly and rather unexpectedly. (Gregorious 
2010:283). 
 
According to Gregoriou (2010:291), financial crisis has been revealed significant 
shortcomings in risk monitoring and risk management for all types of banking 
institutions. Senior management often lacked knowledge and control of the institutional 
risk book and organizational risk management functions dis not possess the required 
capabilities to handle stress scenarios. On top, the relevance of liquidity risk and its inter 
linkage with capital adequacy requirements were systematically ignored. Top 
management should be informed regularly on all financial risk exposures and should 
also carry the responsibility for setting institutional risk tolerance levels. In addition, 
compensation and incentive systems play a central role in shaping the risk-taking 
behavior of bank managers. In the past, there has clearly existed a symbiotic 
relationship between institutional myopia of financial institutions and the short term 
focus of institutional bonus systems. With large compensation packages at stake, some 
managers have been tempted to take disproportionate risks, especially if the risks were 
only expected to become visible after several years. Senior managers had certainly no 
reason to worry about creating a performance minefield with their actions if their risk of 
ever stepping into it again was negligible. By now there appears to be an agreement 
among national regulators and legislatures across Europe that looking forward bonus 
arrangements must be risk adjusted and must also be capped that golden parachutes 
guarantees for senior bank executives must be restricted, and that board remuneration 
committees must be able to act more independently.  
 
Moreover, financial supervision has failed to spot and prevent the financial crisis. The 
shortcomings of the supervisory systems of some of the most developed countries in the 
world are striking and fundamental reforms appear to be inevitable. To ensure more 
effective supervising bodies must be strengthened and unified across national 
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boundaries. Regulators must gain access to reliable and comprehensive information. 
Their reach must include off balance sheet positions and so far unregulated nonbanks 
(mortgage firms, hedge funds) which must be bound the same regulatory standard as 
banks. More importantly, the incentive structures of regulatory agencies must be revised 
to provide stronger incentives for regulators to keep up with new financial 
developments. The fact that regulators have been to some extent aware of the rising 
systematic risk in the subprime market, but have nevertheless failed to take effective 
action further points in this direction. In Europe, financial service supervision has been 
somewhat more centralized with fewer agencies sharing supervisory functions, but only 
on national level. Despite the establishment of single currency area and a single central 
bank, bank supervision has remained a national undertaking largely for political 
reasons. The existence of a single European institution for banking supervision would 
have clearly enforced more consistent European standards for the rescue or support of 
ailing banks and would have prevented the emergence of national discrepancies. 
(Gregoriou 2010:292) 
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4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
This section explains basic theories and key concepts relating to bank capital, bank 
performance and bank exposure. In addition, it also provides their main financial 
measures. This theoretical part is largely based on the textbook Commercial Bank 
Financial Management of Sinkey (1983), Bank Management Text and Cases of 
Hempel, Coleman and Simonson (1990), The Economics of Money, Banking and 
Finance – A European Text of Howells and Bain (1998), Modern Banking of Heffernan 
(2005), Value at Risk and Bank Capital Management of Saita (2007), Bank 
Management and Financial Services of Rose and Hudgins (2008), The Principle of 
Banking of Choudhry (2011). 
4.1 Bank Capital 
Bank capital is important as it is the cushion that absorbs any unreserved losses that the 
bank incurs. By acting as this cushion, it enables the bank to continue operating as a 
going concern and thus avoid insolvency or bankruptcy during periods of market 
correction or economic downturn. When the bank suffers a loss or writes off a loss-
making or otherwise economically untenable activity, the capital is used to absorb the 
loss. This can be done by eating into reserves, freezing dividend payment or (in more 
extreme scenario) writing down equity capital. Moreover, banks occupy a vital and 
pivotal position in any economy, as suppliers of credit and financial liquidity, so bank 
capital is important. As such, banks are heavily regulated by central monetary 
authorities, and their capital is subject to regulatory rules governed by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). (Choudhry 2011:10) 
 
Rose and Hudgin (2008:476) also clearly define the vital function of capital in banking 
operations and their long-run viability. The primary function of bank capital is to absorb 
unexpected financial and operating losses as a cushion against failure risk. Second, 
capital provides the funds needed to charter, organize, and operate a financial firm 
before other sources of funds come flowing in. A new institution needs start-up funding 
to acquire land, build or lease facilities, purchase equipment, and hire offices and staff 
even before opening day. Third, capital promotes public confidence and reassures 
creditors concerning an institution’s financial strength. Capital must also be strong 
enough to reassure borrowers that a lending institution will be able to meet their credit 
needs even if the economy turns down. Fourth, capital provides funds for the 
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organization’s growth and the development of new services and facilities. An infusion 
of additional capital will permit a financial firm to expand into a larger quarter or build 
additional branch offices in order to keep pace with its expanding market and follow its 
customers. Fifth, capital serves as a regulator of growth, helping to ensure that growth is 
sustainable in the long run. Both the regulatory authorities and the financial markets 
require that the capital increases roughly in line with growth of risky assets. Thus the 
cushion to absorb losses is supposed to increase along with the financial institution’s 
growing risk exposure. Finally, capital regulation has become increasingly important 
tool to limit how much risk exposure financial firms can accept. In this role capital not 
only rends to promote public confidence in the financial system but also serves to 
protect the government’s deposit insurance system from serious losses. 
 
There are different concepts related to bank capital such as regulatory capital and 
economic capital. Required regulatory capital is calculated according to regulators’ 
rules and methodologies. The regulators define for each bank a minimum regulatory 
capital requirement (MRCR) as well as clearly identify which components of the bank’s 
balance sheet can be considered to be eligible as capital. In contrast, economic capital is 
developed internally by the bank, which represents an estimate of sufficient fund needed 
to run the business. This estimate may differ from MRCR because the regulators and 
banks use different parameters or methodologies. (Saita, 2007:7) 
4.1.1 Economic Capital 
 
Economic capital is a fundamental and vital part of the commercial banking industry. In 
the bank’s balance sheet, bank capital or stock holder’s equity represents the difference 
between the book value of a bank’s assets and its liabilities. The capital or equity of 
bank includes preferred stocks, common stock, surplus, undivided profits and equity 
reserves (Hempel et.al 1990:40). The bank capital is also categorized into three 
principal forms of such as subordinated debt, preferred stock, and common equity. 
Subordinate debt includes all forms of interest-bearing obligations that repay a fixed 
amount of money at some future time.  
 
The major form of subordinate debt range from capital notes to long-term debentures. 
Subordinated notes and debentures are relatively small components of bank capital but a 
growing source of long-term funding for banks and other intermediaries. Due to 
contractual maturities of debt issues, they have to meet the requirements from the 
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regulatory authorities in order to be qualified as bank capital. Regulations require that 
these capital notes be subordinated to the claims of general creditors of a bank, 
including creditors, thus if a bank closes and its assets are liquidated, the depositors 
have first claim on the proceeds and investors in debentures have a secondary claim. 
However, subordinated debt holders have a prior claim over the common and preferred 
stock holders against earnings and assets.  
 
Preferred stock is relatively insignificant though preferred has increased its importance 
in recent years among the larger banks and bank holding companies around the world. 
Preferred stock often carries floating dividend rates and redeemability feature that allow 
management to call in outstanding shares and pay off shareholders when it is financially 
advantageous to do so. However, bank preferred stock has been slow to win the 
confidence of some investors because of bad experiences during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s when many troubled banks sold preferred shares just to stay afloat. (Rose 
and Hudgin (2008:480). Generally subordinated debt qualified as capital and preferred 
stock are referred to as senior capital because their claims on assets and earnings are 
above those of common stock.  
 
Common equity considered as basic form of bank capital is the sum of the common 
stock, surplus, undivided profits, and equity reserve accounts. The common stock 
account is the total par or stated value of all bank’s outstanding shares. The surplus 
account can be increased by sale of common stock at a premium above its par value. 
Equity reserves include contingency reserves for securities losses and the contingency 
portion of provisions for possible loan losses. Common equity has a residual claim on 
income and assets behind deposits, other liabilities, indebtedness, and preferred stock. 
The book value of the common equity of a commercial bank can be computed by 
subtracting deposit, other liabilities and senior capital from the book value of total 
assets. Although, this book value is imperfect since it ignores the market value of a 
bank’s assets and liabilities, book value is the most widely used measure of common 
equity and always used for capital adequacy purposes. (Hempel et al. 1990:260-262). 
 
The composition of capital is markedly differently for the largest versus the smallest 
financial firms. The smallest banks rely most heavily upon retained earnings (undivided 
profit) to build their capital position and issue minuscule amount of long term debt 
(subordinated notes and debentures). In contrast, in the biggest banks rely principally 
upon the surplus value of their stock sold in the financial marketplace, as well as 
retained earnings, and also issue significant amount of long-term debt capital. These 
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differences reflect the greater ability of the biggest institution to sell their capital 
instruments in the open markets, while the smallest institutions having only limited 
access to the financial markets, must depend on their ability to generate adequate 
income and retain significant portions of those earnings in order to build an acceptable 
capital cushion. (Rose and Hudgin 2008:481) 
4.1.2 Regulatory Capital 
 
The capital position of the banks has been regulated for generations. Banks must meet 
minimum capital requirements before they can be chartered, and they must hold at least 
the minimum required level of capital throughout their corporate life. The cost of the 
capital is the driver behind return on calculation and primary objective of banking 
operations is to meet return of capital target. Hence regulatory capital issues play an 
important part in bank strategy. The need for adequate regulation of the banking 
industry is widely recognized and a string of banking failures in the 1990s emphasized 
this. Lessons were not learned, however, as capital inadequacy was again an issue 
during the “credit crunch” of 2007-2008. By the nature of their activities, banking 
trading and lending desks are risk-takers and the reward culture in many banks provide 
strong incentives for perhaps excessive risk-taking. However, the regulators are more 
concerned with systematic risk, the risk that, as a result of the failure of one bank, the 
whole banking system is put on danger, due to knock-on effects. The integrated nature 
of the global financial industry means that banks are closely entwined and the failures of 
one bank generate a risk of failure for all those banks that have lent funds to the failed 
banks. Therefore, while a bank will be concerned with risk management of its own 
operations, regulators are concerned with the risk to the whole financial system. The 
systematic risk inherent in the banking system means that it is important to have 
sufficiently adequate financial regulation, of which capital requirement rules are one 
example. (Choudhry 2011:76) 
 
Banks and financial institutions are subject to a range of regulations and controls; the 
primary one is concerned with the level of capital that a bank holds, and this level is 
sufficient to provide a cushion underpinning the activities that the bank enters into. 
Typically, an institution is subject to regulatory requirements such as European Union’s 
Capital Adequacy Directive. A capital requirement scheme proposed by a committee of 
central banks acting under the auspices of the BIS 1988 has been adopted universally by 
banks around the world. These are known as the BIS regulatory requirements or the 
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Basel capital ratios. Under the Basel requirements all cash and off-balance sheet 
instrument in a bank’s portfolio are assigned a risk weighting based on their perceived 
credit risk. The Basel Accord of 1988 was a consistent standard applied for determining 
minimum capital requirement across internationally active banks. The regulatory capital 
under Basel Accord was defined to make required capital sensitive to differences in risk 
profiles among banking organizations, thereby with banks holding risker assets acquired 
to a higher level of capital. The ratio required by a regulator will be that level deemed 
sufficient to protect the bank’s depositor. Regulatory capital included equity, 
preferences shares and subordinated debt, as well as the general reserves. The common 
element of these items is that they are all loss-absorbing. 
 
Under Basel I, the BIS rules set a minimum ratio of capital to assets of 8% of the value 
of the assets. Assets are defined in terms of their risk, and it is weighted risk assets that 
are multiplied by the 8% figure. Each asset is assigned a risk weighting, which is 0% for 
risk-free assets such as certain country government bonds, to 20% for inter-bank 
lending, and up to 100% for the highest risk assets such as certain corporate loans. The 
regulatory capital would be broken down into two components as Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 
1 capital consists of higher-quality forms of capital which have the greatest capacity to 
absorb losses. Tier 1 capital includes primarily of core capital, namely common stock, 
surplus, undivided profit, capital reserves and minority interest in consolidated 
subsidiaries. Because these items arise from ownership in the bank, they have the lowest 
priority of repayment in the event of insolvency, thereby representing the highest 
quality of capital. Tier 2 capitals considered as supplementary capital are less reliable. It 
is comprised of items such as hybrid debt/equity instruments, intermediate-term 
preferred stock and term subordinated debt and reserves held for loan losses. These 
instruments are subordinate to the debt the bank owes to other creditors. Due to the 
lower quality of tier 2 capital, Basel I limited the amount of tier 2 capital that could be 
included in the bank’s capital to 100% of tier 1 capital. In order to be considered 
sufficiently capitalized under Basel I, bank had to maintain a capital ratio of 8%. 
(Hempel et.al, 1990:285) 
 
The level of capital requirement is given by the formula: 
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The ratio above therefore set minimum levels. A bank’s risk-adjusted exposure is the 
cash risk-adjusted exposure, together with the total risk-adjusted off-balance sheet 
exposure. For cash products on the banking book the capital charge calculations (risk-
adjusted exposure) is given by the formula, which is calculated for each instrument: 
Principal value x Risk Weighting x Capital charge (8%) 
The sum of the exposure is taken. Firms may use netting or portfolio modelling to 
reduce the total principal value. The BIS makes a distinction between banking book 
transaction as carried out by retail and commercial banks (primarily deposits and 
lending) and trading book transactions as carried out by investment banks and securities 
houses. Capital treatment differs between banking and trading books. A repo 
transaction, for example, attracts a charge on the trading book. The formula for 
calculating the capital allocation is: 
 
CA = max. (((Cmv – Smv) x 8% x RW), 0) 
Where: Cmv = is the value of cash proceeds 
  Smv = is the market value of securities 
  RW = is the counterparty risk-weighting (as a percentage) 
 
The table 2 summaries the elements that comprised the different types of capital that 
made up regulatory capital in the EU’s CAD for Basel I. Tier 1 capital supplementary 
capital is usually issued in the form of non-cumulative preference shares, known in the 
US as preferred stock. Banks generally build Tier 1 reserves as a means of boosting 
capital ratios as well as support a reduced pure equity ratio. Tier 1 capital now includes 
certain securities that have similar characteristics to debt, as they are structured to allow 
interest payment to be made on a pre-tax basis rather than after tax; this means they 
behave like preference shares or equity, and improve the financial efficiency of the 
bank’s regulatory capital. Such securities, along with those classified as Upper Tier 2 
capital, contain interest deferral clauses so that they may be classified similar to 
preference shares or equity. (Choudhry 2011:80-82) 
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Table 2: European Union regulatory capital rules, Basel I (Choudhry 2011:81) 
 
 Limits Capital Type Deductions 
Tier 1  No limit to Tier 1 
 “Esoteric” instruments such as trust-preferred 
securities are restricted to 15% of total Tier 1 
 Equity share capital, including share premium 
account 
 Retained profit 
 Non-cumulative preference shares and other 
hybrid capital securities 
 Bank holdings of its own Tier 1 
instruments 
 Goodwill and other tangible assets 
 Current-year unpublished losses 
Tier 2  Total Tier 2 may not exceed 100% of Tier 1   
Upper  
Tier 2 
  Perpetual subordinated, loss-absorbing debt 
 Cumulative preference shares 
 General reserves 
 Revaluation reserves 
 Holdings of other banks’ own fund 
instruments in excess of 10% of the value 
of own capital 
 Holdings of more than 10% of another 
credit institution’s own funds 
 Specified investments in non-consolidated 
subsidiaries 
 Qualified investments, defined as a holding 
of more than 10% of a company 
Lower  
Tier 2 
 Cannot exceed 50% of Tier 1 
 Amount qualifying as capital amortized on a 
straight-line a basis in the last five years 
 Fixed maturity subordinated debt 
 Perpetual subordinated non-loss absorbing debt 
 
Other  Capital to only include fully paid up amounts 
 Issues of capital cannot include cross-default or negative pledge clauses 
 Default of Lower Tier 2 capital is defined as non-payment of interest or a winding up of the bank 
 No rights of set-off to be included in capital issue documentation 
 Early repayment of debt must be approved by the bank’s regulator 
 Interim profit must be audited amounts, and net of expected losses, tax and dividend 
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The perceived shortcoming of the 1988 Basel capital accord attracted many arguments. 
The main criticisms were that its risk-weightings framework lacked the sensitivity to 
differentiate credit quality in the same asset class, and it used membership in the OECD 
as a measure of sovereign risk. In addition, it did not capture well the associated with 
bank’s securitization exposures in particular and different other financial activities in 
general; thus it was accused of being “one-size fits all approach”. (Heffernan 2005:185). 
The 1988 accord was based on very broad counterparty credit requirements, and despite 
an amendment introduced in 1996 to cover trading book requirements, it remained open 
to the criticism of inflexibility. In response to criticism of the 1988 Accord, a number of 
changes were made, culminating in the 2001 proposal, which were designed “to promote 
safety and soundness in the financial system, to provide a more comprehensive approach 
for addressing risks, and to enhance competitive equality. The proposals were also 
intended to apply to all banks worldwide, and not simply those that are active across 
international borders. The Basel II rules have three pillars in order to be more closely 
related to the risk levels of particular credit exposures, which were minimum capital 
requirements, supervisory review and market discipline. 
 
Basel II requires for a supervisory approach to capital allocation, which is the pillar 2. 
This is based on three principles. First, banks must have a procedure for calculating their 
capital requirements in accordance with their individual risk profile. This means they are 
required to look beyond the minimum capital requirement as provided for under Pillar 1, 
and assess specific risk areas that reflect their own business activities. Second the risk-
weighted capital requirement calculated under Pillar 1 is viewed as minimum only, and 
banks are expected to set aside capital above this minimum level to provide an element of 
reserve. Supervisors are empowered to require a bank to raise its capital level above the 
stipulated minimum. Finally, supervisors are instructed to constantly review the capital 
levels of banks under their authority act accordingly in good time so that such levels do 
not fall below the level deemed sufficient to support an individual bank’s business 
activity. Pillar 3 provides the rules of disclosure about capital, capital adequacy and risk 
exposure. The definition of capital under Basel II remains as it is under Basel I and the 
minimum capital ratios of 4% for Tier 1 and 8% for total capital also remain. (Choudhry 
2011:88) 
 
The minimum capital requirement is calculated by the following formula: 
Minimum capital ratio = 
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In December 2010 the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) which 
comprises the regulators and central bankers of 27 countries, released details of the new 
banking regulatory capital rules, which were termed Basel III. The rules require banks to 
hold a higher amount of core Tier 1 capital than was required under Basel I and Basel II 
regimes. The main provisions under Basel III are summarized in the table 3. 
 
Table 3: Basel III capital ratios 
 
Ratios Core Tier 1  Tier 1 Capital (%) Total Capital (%) 
Minimum ratio 4.5 6.0 8.0 
Capital conservation buffer 2.5 - - 
Minimum plus capital 
conservation buffer 
7.0 8.5 10.5 
Countercyclical capital buffer 
range 
0 - 2.5 - - 
 
The Basel III capital rules will have the effect of improving the overall quality of bank 
capital. There is also a greater emphasis on capital being able to absorb losses on a going 
concern basis. The core Tier 1 consists of ordinary shares and retained earnings. This 
capital takes the first and proportionately greatest share of losses. It is the most deeply 
subordinated, and is perpetual with no expectation that the liability will be bought back or 
redeemed. Non-core Tier 1 consists of contingent convertible and preference shares-type 
instruments that exhibit the following features: 
 fully discretionary coupons, which is non-cumulative; 
 perpetual, with no incentive to redeem; 
 Call feature allowed, but not expectation of call. 
Tier 2 capital consists of long-dated subordinated debt, with no incentives to redeem 
early. Most banks compare both regulatory requirements with regulatory capital and 
internally estimated required economic capital with available economic capital. However, 
economic capital, rather than regulatory capital, is mainly used for risk-adjusted 
performance measurement. (Saita 2007:17). 
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4.2 Bank Performance 
According to Rose and Hudgins (2010), as for financial firms, performance refers to how 
adequately a financial firm meets the needs of its stockholders (owners), employees, 
depositors and other creditors and borrowing customers. At the same time, financial firms 
must find a way to keep government regulators satisfied that their operating policies, 
loans, and investments are sound, protecting the public interest. The success or lack of 
success of these institutions in meeting the expectations of others is usually revealed by a 
careful study of their financial statement. The first step in analyzing financial statements 
to evaluate bank performance is to determine the objectives. Performance must be 
directed toward specific objectives. A fair evaluation of any financial firm's performance 
is started by evaluating whether it has been able to achieve the objective its management 
and stockholders have chosen. Therefore, there are two outstanding methods of 
performance measurement namely stock valuation and profitability ratios (accounting 
measurement). This section centers on the most important dimension of performance- 
profitability and risk. It provides a detailed look at the most widely used indicators of the 
quality and quantity of bank performance. 
 
According to Casu et al. (2006:214), bank performance is calculated using ratio analysis 
and assessed with the aim of (1) looking at past and current trends, and (2) determining 
future estimates of bank performance. Financial ratios analysis investigates different 
areas of bank performance, such as profitability, asset quality and solvency. The basic 
component of ratio analysis is a single ratio, constructed by dividing one balance-sheet 
and/or income-expense item by another. The denominator of such ratio may be conceived 
as a “base” or “scale” factor. In terms of measure of profitability, a bottom line variable 
such as ROE or ROA is well considered, which are measuring the profitability ratio of a 
firm. ROE and ROA use equity capital and total assets, respectively, as the scale factors. 
The return on assets (ROAA) is the net income for the year divided by total assets, 
usually the average value over the year. 
 
          
                    
      
 
ROAE is an internal performance measure of shareholder value. It is considered the most 
popular measure of performance, since it proposes a direct assessment of the financial 
return of a shareholder’s investment. In addition, it uses public information, thus it is 
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easily available for analysts as well as it allows for comparison between different banks 
or different sectors of the economy. 
 
          
                    
      
 
Since there are several definitions of profits and capital, ROE figures may be constructed 
in alternative ways (Sinkey 1986:235). Three common measures of bank profits are 
 
 Income before taxes and securities gains or losses 
 Income after taxes but before securities gains or losses 
 Net income (after taxes and securities gains or losses) 
 
Three common measures of bank capital include: 
 Total equity capital (consisting of common stock, surplus, and undivided profits) 
 Total equity capital plus reserves for losses 
 Total equity capital plus reserves plus debt capital 
 
In addition, other two typical ratios are used to evaluate bank profitability such NIM (Net 
interest margin) and C/I (Cost-income) ratio. NIM is net interest margin and measures the 
net interest income relative to the bank’s total, average or earnings assets. 
 
                                  
            
     
 
It reflects the difference between interests earned on assets minus interest costs per unit 
of assets. The NIM measures the bank’s spread per unit of assets. High NIM suggests that 
the difference between deposit rates and loan (+ other interest earnings assets) rates are 
high and vice versa. Finally, the Cost-income ratio is a quick test of efficiency that 
reflects bank non-interest costs a proportion of income. 
 
                     
                                        
     
 
However, in order to get more comprehensive picture of overall performance, it is 
supposed to look at the profile or vector of financial characteristics. Altman, Haldeman 
and Narayanan (1977) develop a failure prediction model for manufacturers and retailers, 
to distinguish between failed and non-failed firms. Their model consisted of the following 
variables: 
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1. Cumulative profitability (CP)= Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
2. Stability of earnings (SOE)= Standard deviation of ROA 
3. Capitalization (CAP)= Total Assets/Total Equity 
4. Size (S)= Log (Total Assets) 
5. Liquidity (LQD)= Liquid Assets/Total Assets 
6. Debt service (DS)= Total Interest Income/Total Interest Expense 
7. Return on assets (ROA)= Net Income/ Total Assets 
 
The dimensions captured by these seven variables are: current profitability, variability of 
earnings (risk), interest coverage, long-term profitability, liquidity, leverage and size 
respectively. Since Sinkey (1983) shows the Zeta model can be applied with reasonable 
accuracy to the problem of predicting bank failures. The ultimate objective of Zeta model 
is to predict failure. The predictability comes from the coefficients that are estimated 
from a statistical comparison of the financial characteristics of the two groups of firms. 
The rationale is to discriminate between two groups prior to failure and then to use the 
model to identify future failures. One crucial requirement for an early-warning model is 
that the estimated coefficients be stable or stationary so they can be applied to future data 
with confidence. Regarding the use of accounting data, such information is subject to 
different interpretation and to manipulation or “window dressing”. Moreover, earnings 
are especially subject to manipulation.  
4.3 Bank Risks 
Recent changes in the banking environment have posed serious risk challenges for banks 
but also offered productive opportunities. This section will describe the main types of 
risks modern banks have to face. The first primary risk in banking is credit risk. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000), credit risk is defined 
as “the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in 
accordance with agreed terms”. Besides, credit risk is also described as the risk of a bad 
loan unpaid in full in the servicing of a loan (Heffernan 2005:104). Therefore, credit risk 
is considered as the risk of decline in the creditworthiness of counterparty. Such 
deterioration does not imply default, but means that the probability of default increases. 
Thus, it is recommended for bank managers to build diversified portfolio assets by 
combining both loans and securities to minimize credit losses since this assets 
combination will diversify the degree of risk. A portfolio of assets with varying degree of 
risk will help banks avoid credit risk by providing them compensation in a way that that 
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higher default risk is accompanied by higher expected return. In addition, there is an 
internal financial ratio needed to be monitored when managing credit risk by looking at 
the changes in the ratio: medium-quality loans/total assets ratio. The bank can choose to 
lower its credit risk by lowering this ratio. Another important credit-risk measure is the 
ratio of total loans to total deposits. The higher the ratio the greater the concerns of 
regulatory authorities, as loans are among the riskiest of bank assets. A greater level of 
non-performing loans to deposits could also generate greater risk for depositors. If the 
data on medium quality loans are not available, traditional proxies for credit risk include 
instance: (1) total loans/total assets, (2) non-performing loans/total loans, (3) loan 
losses/total loans, (4) loan loss reserves/total assets. 
 
In banks the key market risk is interest risk, which is the risk of loss of earnings due to 
movement in interest rates. Interest rate risk arises from the impact of fluctuating interest 
rates and will directly affect either borrowers or investors. A rise in market interest rates 
has the effect of increasing banks’ funding costs because the cost of variable rate deposits 
and other variable rate financing increases. If loans have been made a fixed interest rates 
this obviously reduces the net returns on such loans. On the other hand, banks will be 
vulnerable to falling rate of they hold an excess of fixed rate liabilities. In the case of 
bonds, increasing interest rate will reduce the market value of a bond investment. 
Typically, long term, fixed-income securities subject their holders to the greatest amount 
of interest rate risk. In contrast, short term securities such as Treasury bills are much less 
influenced by interest rate movements (Casu et al. 2006:262). Besides, reinvestment risk 
is an essentially interest rate risk, which is created when an asset makes any payments 
before the investor’s horizon, whether it matures or not. Thus, there is the risk of 
reinvesting that cashflow until the horizon date with lower interest rates. Since the 
reinvestment rate is unknown when the asset is purchased, the final cash flow is 
uncertain.  
 
Another important risk is liquidity risk, which is the risk that the bank is holding 
insufficient liquid assets on its balance sheet to meet requirements without impairment to 
its financial or reputational capital. On other words, liquidity risk is generated in the 
balance sheet by a mismatch between the size and maturity of assets and liabilities. Thus, 
banks have to manage their liquidity to ensure that both predictable and unpredictable 
liquidity demands are met. There are two common types of liquidity risk. The first type is 
day-to-day liquidity risk relating to daily withdrawals. This is usually predictable because 
only a small percentage of a bank’s deposit will be withdrawn in a given day. The second 
is liquidity crisis occurs when depositors demand larger withdrawals than normal. In this 
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situation, banks are forced to borrow fund at an elevated interest rate, higher than the 
market rate that other banks are paying for similar borrowings. This is usually 
unpredictable and can be due to either a lack of confidence in the specific bank, or some 
unexpected need for cash. Liquidity cries can ultimately hinder the ability of a bank to 
repay its obligations and in the absence of central bank intervention or deposit insurance 
it could result in “a run” and even the insolvency of the bank. Typically banks can reduce 
their exposure to liquidity risk by increasing their proportion of funds committed to cash 
and readily marketable assets, such as Treasury bills (T-bills) and other government 
securities, or use longer term liabilities to fund the bank’s operations. However, there is 
the trade-off between liquidity and profitability, as the opportunity cost of stored liquidity 
is high and holding low-yielding assets on the balance sheet reduces bank profitability 
(Heffernan 2005:105). One measure banks can use to monitor liquidity risk relate short-
term securities, a proxy for bank’s liquidity sources, to total deposits – this provides an 
approximate measure of a bank’s liquidity needs. Another traditional ratio of liquidity 
risk is the loan/deposit ratio. This ratio tends to focus on the liquidity of assets on the 
balance sheet. A high ratio of short term securities/deposits and a low loan/deposit ratio 
indicate that the bank is less risky but also less profitable. (Casu et al. 2006:265) 
 
The fourth risk in banking is operational risk, which is the risk of loss associated with 
non-financial matters such as fraud, system failure, accidents and ethics. Risk 
Management Group of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001b) defines 
operational risk as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems from external events. Operational risk can be mitigated by defining 
strict procedures for all aspects of a bank’s business functions, and ensuring adherence 
them. Operation risk is one of the main innovations proposed for Basel II requiring banks 
to hold capital for such risks along with credit and market risk. The bank’s risk 
management function should assign a dedicated person or team to managing operational 
risk and each department of the bank should appoint an operational risk liaison who will 
work as the primary contact for the head of operational risk. 
 
Capital is considered important as well because all the risks described above can 
potentially affect a bank’s capital. In other words, excessive credit risk, market risk, 
operational risk and liquidity risk, etc. could all result in a bank having insufficient 
capital to cover such losses. Therefore, capital risk refers to the decrease in market value 
of assets below the market value of its liabilities. Besides, capital risk is closely tied to 
financial leverage and banks are typically highly leveraged firms (Heffernan 2005:109). 
It also depends on the asset quality and the overall risk profile of the institution. In 
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addition, banks with high capital risk also normally experience greater periodic 
fluctuations in earnings. Capital risk, therefore, is the same as the risk of insolvency or 
risk of failure. In order to monitor capital risk, the banks should well manage the 
following indicators since they are all signals of failure risk. The first common indicator 
is the interest rate spread between market yields on bank debt issues and market yields on 
government securities of the same maturity. If the spread increases then investors believe 
that the bank in question becoming more risky relative to government debt – investors in 
the market expect a higher risk of loss from purchasing and holding the bank’s debt. 
Another indicator is the ratio of stock price per share to annual earnings per share. The 
ratio will often fall if investors come to believe that a bank is undercapitalized relative to 
the risks it has taken on. In addition, the ratio of equity capital to total assets: a low level 
of equity relative to assets may indicate higher risk exposure for debt holders and 
shareholders. Besides, the Basel Tier 1 (equity capital to risk-weighted assets) and Basel 
Tier 2 (total capital to risk weighted assets) ratios: indicate how well equity capital and 
total capital, respectively, relate to the minimum (4% and 8%) regulatory requirements. A 
decline in either ratio indicates that a bank has less capital to cover potential losses. 
Ratios that fall below the minimum levels, as was the case for certain Japanese banks 
between 1997 and 2005, are an indication of technically insolvent institutions. (Casu et 
al. 2006:275)  
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5. EMPIRICAL TESTS 
 
This section focuses on description of empirical testing that is used to test hypotheses of 
the study. The main hypothesis is to test whether higher bank capital level can help 
enhance the level of profitability and reduce risk exposure that banks take around the 
crisis. In addition, it also emphasizes on further testing whether the capital effect on bank 
profitability and bank risk is different among bank categories and bank size. The sample 
covers banks operating in 15 European countries during the financial crisis from 2005-
2011. The empirical part begins with the construction of empirical hypotheses based on 
previous studies and related theories. The next section is to provide information about the 
data source and collection as well as data description. The methodology describes the 
models and different variables that are used to construct the models. 
5.1 Empirical Hypotheses 
The main empirical hypotheses of this paper are formulated basing on previous studies 
and existing theories about the effects of bank capital on different dimensions of bank 
activities. This section will review these theories and empirical evidences and indicate 
how they explain the relationship between capitals, risk, and profitability; thereby 
forming the hypotheses to be tested. 
 
 Bank capital and bank profitability 
 
The hypotheses about the relation between bank capital and bank performance are 
affected by following theoretical and empirical literatures. According to “trade-off” 
theory, there is an optimal capital structure that maximizes the value of firm in balancing 
the cost and benefits of additional unit of debt. Thus, a bank in equilibrium will hold an 
optimal level of capital to trade off their cost and benefits, implying a “zero relationship” 
at the margin. There is an implication for optimal capital that if the capital level the bank 
holds is below its target, that bank can improve its profitability by increasing their capital. 
In the long-run, regulatory capital requirements may exceed the bank’s optimal capital 
ratio and drive a negative relationship between capital and return. Therefore, this theory 
implies that higher capital only reduce bank’s profitability if banks are above their target 
capital level, for instance due to capital requirement or unexpected shocks. Besides, 
banks’ optimal capital ratios are likely to vary over the cycle, typically rising when there 
are higher expected cost of distress, the relationship between capital and profitability 
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becomes more positive during periods of distress as banks increase their capital ratios to 
provide reassurance to investors and improve their profitability. In terms of empirical 
evidence, as being documented in the study of Berger (1995), large banks with higher 
capital ratios are able to improve profitability during crises and also sustain their higher 
profit in the post-crisis period. However, the profitability of small banks with higher 
capital level is enhanced during banking crisis but deteriorates after the crisis relative to 
that of their lower-capital peers. On the other hand, medium banks suffer an inverse 
relationship between their capital and profitability after banking crisis but “zero 
relationship” during banking crisis. Overall, it is expected that bank’s capital has positive 
impact on its profitability Therefore, the hypothesis used to test the relationship between 
bank capital and bank profit is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Capital improves the bank’s profitability around the financial crisis. 
 
 Bank capital and bank risk 
 
The theories and empirical evidences provide mixed results for the relation between bank 
capital and bank risk. The regulatory hypothesis regulators encourage banks to increase 
their capital relatively with the amount of risk taken. As indicated by Kahane (1977), 
Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988), banks could respond to 
regulatory actions forcing them to increase their capital by increasing their asset risk. As 
Altunbas et al. (2007) document, there is a positive relationship between capital levels 
and banks risks. Namely, banks with higher loan loss reserves tend to have higher capital 
levels. However, “moral hazard hypothesis” predicts the bank with greater financial 
leverage (lower capital ratio) and greater operational leverage would have greater risk-
taking incentives. The negative relationship between bank capital and bank risk is also 
related to deposit insurance system which backed up by the government. Deposit 
insurance enables the banks to undertake excessive risky strategies by insulating the 
major creditors or depositors of banks against decrease in bank asset values. Depositors 
view insured deposits as riskless, and therefore, they would not require higher risk-
premiums for the bank’s greater risk-taking. Basing on above literature, the second 
hypothesis relating to association between bank capital and bank risk is formed as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Capital reduces bank’s riskiness around the financial crisis 
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5.2 Data Description 
This study analyzes a panel data comprising 15 European countries over the period 2005-
2011 including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. The complete sample 
of banks includes a total number of 4,700 observations; however, a smaller sample is 
being used for the study. There are several banks being deleted since they entered, exited 
or were taken over during the study time, which would create the possibility of various 
kinds of sample selection effects. In addition, bank with smaller than maximum number 
of time observations are excluded, creating a balanced panel. The final data set consists 
of 850 banks from 15 countries. A panel data set on different ratios of bank performance 
such as capital ratios, ROA, ROE, NIM, etc., is collected for same group of bank in 
different years.  
 
The data covers seven-year period from 2005-2011. This period of time is divided into 
three sub-periods which is relevant with financial crisis timeline. In detail, the period 
from January 2005 to December 2006 is defined as the pre-crisis. The crisis period spans 
from January 2007 to December 2008. The period from 2009 to 2011 is defined post-
crisis. Moreover, I split the sample into different bank specializations as commercial 
banks, corporate banks and other banks. Also, total 850 banks is categorized into small 
banks with total assets up to 1 billion euro; medium bank with total assets exceeding 1 
billion euro and up to 3 billion euro and large bank with total assets exceeding 3 billion 
euro. The data set is panel data because this thesis studies the same set of banks over 
years from 2005-2011. The benefit is that I can have multiple observations on the same 
bank to control for certain unobserved characteristics of the banks.  
 
The data relating bank’s profitability and other specific characteristics are extracted from 
income statement and balance sheet of European banks acquiring from Bureu van Dijk’s 
BankScope database. The bank risk data are manually calculated. The macroeconomic 
rates are extracted from World Bank database. The summary of data source and 
definition is in table 4.  
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Table 4: Summary of Variables, Descriptions and Data Sources. 
 
Classification Variable Descriptions Sources 
Profitability ROA Return on Assets BankScope 
 ROE Return on Equity BankScope 
 NIM Net Interest Margin BankScope 
Risk SDROA Standard deviation of ROA  Calculated 
 SDROE Standard deviation of ROE  Calculated 
 Ln(Z – Score) Natural Logarithm of Z-Score Calculated 
Capital CAP Equity to Capital BankScope 
Bank Control 
Variables 
Ln(TA) Natural Logarithm of Total Assets Calculated 
 NLTA Net Loans to Total Asset BankScope 
 LAD 
 
Liquid Assets to Customer and 
Short term Deposits 
BankScope 
Macro Control 
Variables 
INFL Inflation World Bank 
 GW GDP Growth rate World Bank 
 CON Market concentration World Bank 
 PUB Public Debt World Bank 
 UNEM Unemployment rate  World Bank 
5.3 Regression Variables  
In the empirical method, I examine the effect of capital on bank performance and bank 
risk during the financial crisis. The dependent variables used in the regressions are bank’s 
profitability and risk, capital is a key independent variable; whilst there is a list of control 
variables for bank specific characteristics and macroeconomic environment. This section 
will give the definitions of the variables as well as their expected sign and reasons to use 
them in the regression. 
 
 Profitability variables 
 
I measure bank’s performance using the bank’s return on equity (ROE), return on assets 
(ROA) and net interest margin (NIM). These performance variables are computing basing 
on accounting method using ratio analysis. NIM is a measure of a bank’s efficiency in 
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maintaining interest expenses at a minimum for a given value of interest income. ROA 
relates to a bank’s ability to generate positive net income from its investment in its assets, 
while ROE is the return that shareholders receive from their investment in bank capital. 
Among them, ROE is a comprehensive profitability measure since net income and equity 
both reflect the banks’ on and off-balance sheet activities. In addition, ROE is considered 
the most popular measure of performance, since it provides direct assessment of the 
financial return of a shareholder’s investment. Moreover, it uses public information and 
allows for easy comparison between different banks or different sectors of the economy. 
 
 Risk variables 
 
Dependent variables used to measure bank’s risk are as standard deviation of ROA 
(SDROA), standard deviation of ROE (SDROE), which is calculated using the 
overlapping ROA and ROE data averaged every two years. According to Brealey, Myers 
and Marcus (2004:275), risk depends on the dispersion or spread of possible outcomes. 
More variable returns imply greater risk. This suggests that some measure of dispersion 
will provide a reasonable measure of risk and dispersion is precisely what is measured by 
variance or standard deviation. Therefore, SDROA and SDROE are standard deviation of 
return on assets and standard deviation of equity respectively are obtained as proxies for 
bank’s risk.  
 
Furthermore, I use Z-score as a proxy for bank’s risk-taking behavior. The Z-score has 
frequently used to analyze the determinants of bank risk-taking (Altunbas et al. 2017). It 
is defined as the ratio of the return on assets plus the capital ratio divided by the standard 
deviation of the return on assets. The Z-score is the inverse of the probability of 
insolvency, as higher Z-score indicates that a bank incurs fewer risks and is more stable. 
More specifically, it indicates the number of standard deviation below the expected value 
of a bank’s return on assets at which equity is depleted and the bank is insolvent (Boyd et 
al 1993). Because the Z-score is highly skewed, I use the natural logarithm of the Z-score 
in my empirical analysis. Moreover, according to Strolbel and Lepetit (2013), the log of 
Z-score is considered unproblematic insolvency risk measure to use in the standard 
regression analysis. Besides, the traditional calculation method of Z-score is shown to be 
upwardly unbiased. This ratio is calculated by the formula that: 
               
                     ⁄
    
) 
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 Capital variable 
 
The capital ratio of each bank is obtained, which is used as independent variable for 
evaluating its relation with bank’s profitability and riskiness. It is the ratio of book value 
of equity to total assets. There are several empirical results showing a significant positive 
association between bank capital and bank performance (Berger 1995; Demiguc-Kunt 
and Huizinga (1999), thus capital ratio is expected to be positive with bank profitability. 
For example, Demiguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) document a direct association between 
bank capital and net interest margin, as well-capitalized banks have higher net interest 
margins and are more profitable. Altunbas et al. (2007) also confirm that capital levels 
and profitability are positively related.  
 
 Bank control variables 
 
The regressions contain a set of bank specific control variables which include: bank size, 
bank’s liquidity (Lee & Hsieh 2013, Akhigbe et al 2012, Berger & Bouwman 2013, 
Altunbas et al. (2007). The bank specific variables include net loan to total assets, liquid 
asset to deposit and bank size. Since the ratio of net loan to total assets is considered as a 
measure of both credit risk and lending specialization in the empirical banking literature, 
which may increase risk when rising. Higher loans volumes can indicate looser loan 
granting criteria which results to decrease in credit quality and increase in credit risk. 
Also, higher NLTA might indicate that a bank specializes in lending because it benefits 
from informational advantages, which may reduce intermediation costs and enhance 
profitability. Therefore, loan ratio is expected to have positive impact on bank riskiness 
and profitability. Dietrich & Wanzenreid (2011) also find a positive relationship between 
growth of gross loans and profitability. In terms of bank liquidity, it is expected to have 
inverse relation with bank risk as the banks that are more liquid may be more efficient 
and less likely suffer shock during crisis. Meanwhile, it is reasonable to expect banks will 
hold liquid assets to the extent they help to maximize its profitability. Bank size is 
measured as the natural log of the bank’s assets. Since though economies of scale bank 
size may influence the relationship between capitals and risk, I control for the assets size 
of bank. Goddard et al. (2004) explore a result relating to impact of bank size on its 
performance. However, Boyd and Runkle (1993) discover an inverse association between 
bank size and profitability in their study. 
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 Macroeconomic control variables. 
 
In the empirical analysis, there are some specifications incorporate a group of 
macroeconomic controls including Inflation (INFL), public debt (PUB), unemployment 
(UNEM), GDP growth (GW) and the regional market concentration which is Herfindahl - 
Hirschman index for credit institution for each country (CON). The coefficients of PUB 
and UNEM are uncertain. Molyneux and Thorton (1992) provide an empirical evidence 
for a positive link between inflation and bank profitability. Besides, a higher economic 
growth may imply that banks can generate more profitability and less risk. Moreover, it is 
necessary to control for market concentration. Banking systems in larger countries such 
as Germany, France and Italy are more fragmented; meanwhile in smaller countries tend 
to be concentrated. For banks operating in more concentrated countries have higher HHI 
index and they have more probability to increase the profitability of local loans and 
deposits as well as make it easier to improve profitability. 
5.3 Empirical Method 
For econometric analysis of panel data, it is unable to assume that the observations are 
independently distributed across time. In any cross-section there are so many unmeasured 
explanatory variables that determine dependent variable that their influence gives rise to a 
different intercept for each individual (Kennedy 2003:303). This phenomenon suggests 
that OLS is biased unless the influence of these omitted variables is uncorrelated with the 
included explanatory variables. Therefore, with the aim of improving estimation, fixed 
effects estimator is used to remove the unobserved effect and also any time-constant 
explanatory variables prior to estimation. The fixed effect transformation consists of 
subtracting from the observation of each individual the average value of all observations 
for that individual. The method is described as considering the following econometric 
model: 
 
                                                  t = 1,…, T; i = 1,…, N.  (a) 
 
For each i, average this equation over time, I get 
 
 ̅      ̅       ̅       ̅       ̅         ̅       (b) 
 
Where,   ̅  = 
  ∑    
 
   ,   ̅  = 
  ∑    
 
   ,   ̅  =  
  ∑    
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Because    is fixed over time, it appears in both (a) and (b), therefore I subtract (b) from 
(a) for each t to eliminate    and gives, 
 
      ̅     (       ̅  )     (       ̅  )     (       ̅  )     (       ̅  )      
  ̅   
Or 
 
 ̈       ̈         ̈         ̈         ̈             ̈  , t = 1… T  (c) 
 
Where,   ̈          ̅ ,    ̈          ̅     ̈          ̅  
 
As can be seen from equation (c), the unobserved effect    has disappeared. Therefore, I 
will estimate (c) by panel least squares method, based on the time-demeaned variables. 
Under a strict exogeneity assumption on the explanatory variables, the fixed effects 
estimator is unbiased, meaning the idiosyncratic error uit should be uncorrelated with 
each explanatory variable across all time periods. The fixed effects estimator allows for 
arbitrary correlation between    and the explanatory variables in any time period. Hence, 
any explanatory variable that is constant over time for all i gets swept away by the fixed 
effect transformation (Wooldridge 2013:467). 
 
The other assumption needed for least squares analysis to be valid is that the error uit is 
homoscedasticity. Thus, a White test was also conducted to investigate cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity and the null hypothesis of homocedasticity is not rejected at the 5% 
level of significant. Even though heteroscedasticity does not cause coefficient estimates 
to be biased, the variance and standard error of the coefficients tend to be underestimated. 
Therefore, robust standard errors are used in the regression. Besides, a challenge in 
modelling a panel with long time dimension is that variables are likely to be non-
stationary. Thus, I conduct the unit root test to test the null hypothesis if the variables are 
non-stationary. The test statistics reject the null hypothesis to conclude that the data is 
stationary.  
 
The approach adopted to test empirical hypotheses is suggested by Shrieves and Dahl 
(1992) and Rime (2001) to estimate the relationship between risk, capital and 
profitability. However, with the modification of the original approach, the data level is 
used rather than changes of data as the thesis is limited by the length of data period. The 
model that establishes the relationship between bank capital and profitability (risk) is 
based on earlier literature. According to the earlier literature discussion and purpose of 
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this thesis, I modify the works of Altunbas et al (2007) to establish the relationship 
between bank capital and bank profitability (riskiness). This paper mainly investigates the 
relationship among capital and profitability as well as riskiness for European banks with 
the latest and wider ranges of panel data covering 850 banks in 15 countries from 2005-
2011. The relationship between bank capital and bank profitability (risk) can be specified 
as follows: 
 
                                                   (1) 
                                                   (2) 
Here, t and i denote time period and banks, respectively. Equation (1) and (2) are 
designed to examine the impact of bank capital on bank profitability and bank risk, 
respectively. Term CAPi,t is the level of bank capital, proxies by the equity-to-assets ratio; 
Profiti,t refers to the ith bank’s profitability in the period t, proxied by three profitability 
variables: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and net interest margin (NIM). 
In addition, Riski,t denotes the ith bank’s risk in the period t, proxied by three risk 
variables: standard deviation of ROA (SDROA), standard deviation of ROE (SDROE) and 
Ln(Z-score). Term Banki,t  includes the set of internal control variables related to bank 
specific characteristics such as net loan to total assets (NLTA), liquid assets to customer 
and short-term deposits (LAD) and bank size (SIZE). Term Countryi,t refers to five macro 
control variables relating to country-specific characteristics such as: inflation (INFL), 
GDP growth rate (GW), public debt (PUB), unemployment (UNEM) and  market 
concentration (CON).  
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter goes through the empirical results and analysis as well as their implications. 
The first section presents the descriptive statistic describing the variable means over the 
sample period for different size and type of banks and correlation matrix between 
variables. The second section discusses the results of empirical tests relating to 
relationship between capital and profitability (risk) considering different bank types and 
bank size. In addition, the analysis also is extended by presenting the result of stock 
return and capital relation during and post crisis. Finally, in order to check the robustness 
of the empirical results, I present the empirical results after considering the impact of the 
financial crisis. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regression models. 
Table 6 only presents the comparative study on the variables means of banking 
characteristics in terms of bank categories (commercial, cooperative and other bank) and 
bank size (large, medium and small bank). The mean capital ratio among all banks in the 
sample is about 10%, with the range from -30.52% to 92.8%. The minimum capital ratio 
at -30.52% belongs to a commercial bank, due to the fact that the value of bank’s assets 
falls below the value of bank’s total liabilities. It is can be explained that during the 
financial crisis, bank capital becomes negative because of large amount of write-off bad 
loans, thereby bank insolvency occurs. Besides, the cooperative banks obtain the highest 
mean value of capital ratio at 11.6% versus other banking types because they are 
supervised and controlled by banking authorities and have to maintain their capital level 
in line with prudent banking regulation. Meanwhile, the small banks have the highest 
average value of capital ratio of 12.6%; the large banks, on the other hand, have the 
lowest mean of only 6.6%. This is understandable because the large banks benefits from 
economies of scale, which allows better diversification to reduce risk and operate with 
lower capital level as well as less-stable funding. 
 
As shown in Table 5, typically the average value of ROA for all banks was 0.56%, while 
ROE was 5.5% and NIM 2.52%. Usually, the benchmark for ROA level is around 1% 
whilst ROE is considered good when over 10%. Among different bank categories, on 
average, cooperative banks earn the highest return on assets and net interest margin 
(0.64% and 2.9%, respectively) and commercial banks earn the lowest return (0.39% and 
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Variable  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.
CAP 9.973 9.141 92.854 -30.518 6.321
NIM 2.522  2.502 26.309 -5.759 1.579
ROA 0.568 0.575 21.199 -22.429 1.175
ROE 5.508 6.443 202.727 -992.293 21.985
SDROA 0.324 0.143 21.391 0,000 0.767
SDROE 4.332 1.574 701.221 0,000 17.160
Ln(Z-score) 4.314 4.166 9.312 -6.441 1.372
LAD 29.413 18.780 927.680 0.000 39.214
NLTA 63.799 69.161 99.583 0.004 20.524
CONCE 531.590 407.000 3700.00 174.000 380.785
GDP 0.635 1.683 6.588 -8.539 2.652
INF 2.054 1.999 4.880 -4.480 1.021
PUB 87.221 104.250 136.888 3.610 28.850
UNE 7.710 7.700 21.700 3.100 2.180
2.2%, respectively). Regarding performance across different bank size group, medium 
banks have the highest average value of ROA and ROE (0.77% and 7.97%, respectively); 
while the lowest ROA mean belongs to larger bank (0.41% and 4.93%, respectively). As 
expected, the profitability is significantly lower than for commercial banks and large 
banks, but higher for cooperative and medium banks. The reason might be around the 
financial crisis, there is an increase in non-performing loans and assets and charge-offs, 
leading to sharp decline in commercial bank’s earnings. In addition, large banks’ profit is 
most negatively impacted due to changes in the market value of investment securities 
during earnings stress period, since large banks frequently hold large amount of these 
assets on their balance sheet. 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics for all variables 
Notes: All values are sample means, CAP: Equity-to-total-assets, ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on 
equity, NIM: net interest margin, SDROA (SDROE): Standard deviation of ROA (ROE) is calculated using 
overlapping ROA (ROE) data averaged every two year, Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score, LAD: 
Liquid assets to customers and short-term deposits, NLTA: net loans to total assets, CONCE: Market 
concentration index, GW: GDP growth rate, INFL: inflation, PUB: public debt to total GDP, UNE: 
Unemployment rate. 
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Variables All banks
Commercial 
Bank
Cooperative 
Bank
Other Bank Large Bank
Medium 
Bank
Small Bank
CAP  9.973  8.034  11.647  9.203  6.639  9.633  12.652
NIM  2.521  2.211  2.904  2.237  1.845  2.611  3.024
ROA  0.568  0.396  0.639  0.608  0.414  0.774  0.635
ROE  5.508  4.383  5.499  6.445  4.931  7.971  5.312
SDROA  0.324  0.425  0.224  0.381  0.311  0.255  0.351
SDROE  4.331  7.230  2.050  5.168  6.419  3.246  2.993
Ln(Zscore)  4.314  4.152  4.479  4.215  4.347  4.596  4.215
LADSF  29.413  39.615  21.139  32.706  37.424  28.979  23.301
NLTA  63.798  57.382  67.652  63.632  60.097  64.813  66.408
Bank No 850 216 371 263 324 109 417
Comparing the average return volatility across banking groups, I find that the small banks 
and cooperative banks have the lowest standard deviation of ROA & ROE, while the 
highest value results from the commercial banks and large banks. Meanwhile, the highest 
mean value of Ln(Z-score) fall on cooperative banks, followed by other banks and 
commercial banks. Besides, medium banks show the highest distance from insolvency as 
measured by Ln(Z-score), followed by large banks and small banks. Briefly, cooperative 
banks might be less fragile than others as they have stable deposit and customer basis, 
focus on capital preservation and do not maximize profits as commercial banks but 
customer surplus which could serve as a potential cushion in weaker periods. 
Furthermore, disperse membership and dominance by managers in risk-taking decision 
might reduce incentives for riskiness and thus fragility. In addition, large banks are 
expected to suffer more volatile returns as they are have greater reliance on non-interest 
income. A plausible explanation is that fee-based activities are associated with increased 
earnings volatility. Besides, as shown in Table 5, commercial banks and small banks have 
lowest distance to insolvency compared to other bank specializations. 
 
Table 6: Variable means over the sample period (2005 - 2011). 
Notes: All values are sample means, CAP: Equity-to-total-assets, ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on 
equity, NIM: net interest margin, SDROA (SDROE): Standard deviation of ROA (ROE) is calculated using 
overlapping ROA (ROE) data averaged every two years, Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score, LAD: 
Liquid assets to customers and short-term deposits, LLP: Loan loss reserves to gross loans, NLTA: Net 
loans to total assets. 
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The sample mean of loan ratio (NLTA) is 29.4% for all banks, which ranges from 0 to 
99.6%. The financial institutions holding very low loan to total assets ratio are securities 
firms and private banking and asset management companies, when they have almost zero 
loan growth. While finance companies (credit card, factoring and leasing) have the 
largest portion of loan, as their net loans accounts for approximately 100% of total assets. 
Among different banks categories, on average, cooperative banks and small banks have 
the highest loan ratio (67.65% and 66.4%, respectively), but commercial banks and large 
banks have the lowest (57.4% and 60%, respectively). The figures reflect the fact that 
these banks more involved in market-based activities rather than traditional bank lending. 
Whilst the cooperative banks in Europe have impressive market shares and traditionally 
play dominant role in lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
 
In terms of bank liquidity, the mean value of liquid assets to customer and short-term 
deposits (LAD) is 29.4% for all banks. The maximum mean value is 927.68% belonging 
for specialized government credit institution, while the minimum value was almost zero 
resulting from finance companies (credit card, factoring and leasing). Comparing average 
LAD across bank types, I find that commercial banks and large banks hold the largest 
portion of liquid assets to customer and short-term deposits (39.6% and 37.4%, 
respectively); meanwhile, cooperative banks and small banks have the lowest mean ratio 
(21.14% and 23.3%, respectively). 
 
The mean GDP growth among 15 countries in the sample was 0.64% with a range from -
8.5 to 6.5%. The country experienced the negative GDP growth is Finland in 2009. 
During the period of financial crisis, there are many European countries suffering two 
consecutive years of negative economic growth such as Italy, Ireland, and Sweden. It is 
obvious that, the credit crunch causes a fall in bank lending and investment, leading to a 
serious recession in European region. In terms of inflation rate, the average value is 
2.08% for 15 countries, ranging from -4.48 to 4.88%. The country has the negative 
inflation rate is Ireland in 2009; also Ireland has the highest positive rate of 4.88% in 
2007. During the period 2007-2009, Ireland had to suffer a sharp decline in both GDP 
growth as well as inflation. This is due to the fact that when the global financial crisis 
came, the Irish property market collapsed, saddled with substantial loss of government 
revenue, Ireland suddenly suffered a large amount of fiscal deficit. Regarding public 
debt-to-GDP ratio, the mean ratio is 87.2%; the maximum value is 136.89% from Greece 
in 2009; while the minimum is 3.61% from Luxembourg in 2005. It is understandable 
that the recession causes a steep deterioration in government finance, especially when 
there is negative economic growth; the government receives less tax, leading to a rapid 
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rise in debt-to-GDP ratio. In terms of unemployment rate, the average ratio among 15 
countries is 7.7%, ranging from 3.1% from Netherlands in 2008 to 21.7% from Spain in 
2011. It is explained that due to the severe impact of global recession, Eurozone GDP 
decreases significantly during the crisis, and is accompanied by a sharp increase in 
unemployment. 
 
Table 8 provides the matrix of correlation coefficient. The correlation coefficients 
measure the degree to which two variables movements are associated. If the explanatory 
variables in the regression model are perfectly or highly correlated, multicollinearity 
exists, which leads to biased estimation for explanatory variables but still keeps the 
model reliable. As shown in the table, the coefficients are usually small (less than 0.5), 
indicating that the correlation between variables fairly. According to Kennedy (2003), the 
multicollinearity is a critical problem when the correlation is above 0.8, which is not the 
case of this study. Even though there are two significantly high correlation coefficients 
occurring between ROA and ROE as well as SDROA and SDROE at 0.67 and 0.77, 
respectively, these two pairs are not explanatory variables in the same regression. 
Therefore, multicollinearity is not a problem in all regressions running in this thesis.  
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CAP CONCE GW INF LAD NIM NLTA PUB ROA ROE UNE SDROA SDROE Ln(Z-score) SIZE 
CAP 1
CONCE -0,139*** 1
(0,000)
GW -0,017 0,122*** 1
(0,177) (0,000)
INF -0,010 -0,047*** 0,290*** 1
(0,400) (0,000) (0,000)
LAD -0,001 0,051*** 0,043*** 0,024* 1
(0,928) (0,000) (0,000) (0,060)
NIM 0,310*** -0,178*** -0,020 0,021* -0,207*** 1
(0,000) (0,000) (0,116) (0,096) (0,000)
NLTA 0,055*** -0,039*** -0,048*** -0,042*** -0,558*** 0,234 1
(0,000) (0,002) (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000)
PUB 0,119*** -0,442*** -0,322*** -0,033** -0,154*** 0,203*** 0,161*** 1
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,010) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
ROA 0,179*** -0,037** 0,176*** -0,031** 0,002 0,129*** 0,012 -0,043*** 1
(0,000) (0,040) (0,000) (0,014) (0,846) (0,000) (0,333) (0,001)
ROE 0,027** -0,030** 0,153*** 0,006 0,040*** 0,023* -0,005 -0,056*** 0,672*** 1
(0,034) (0,022) (0,000) (0,627) (0,000) (0,075) (0,663) (0,000) (0,000) ----- 
UNE -0,019 -0,012 -0,172*** -0,165*** -0,008 -0,090*** -0,009 0,080*** -0,119*** -0,126*** 1
(0,137) (0,352) (0,000) (0,000) (0,510) (0,000) (0,448) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) ----- 
SDROA 0,090*** 0,084*** -0,060*** -0,007 0,034*** 0,042*** -0,081*** -0,078*** -0,270*** -0,330*** 0,054*** 1
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,559) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
SDROE -0,105*** 0,092*** -0,052*** 0,000 0,023* -0,030** -0,069*** -0,062*** -0,310*** -0,623*** 0,076*** 0,770*** 1
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,991) (0,068) (0,017) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
Ln(Z-score) 0,069*** -0,090*** -0,002 0,012 -0,035*** -0,033*** 0,090*** 0,046*** 0,080*** 0,075*** 0,010 -0,250*** -0,180*** 1
(0,000) (0,000) (0,850) (0,347) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,440) (0,000) (0,000)
SIZE -0,510*** 0,321*** 0,084*** 0,023* 0,174*** -0,412*** -0,161*** -0,382*** -0,104*** -0,017 0,010*** -0,040*** 0,099*** 0,030** 1
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,077) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,170) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,021)
Table 7: Correlation matrix. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p – values, ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significant level, respectively. CAP: Equity-to-total-assets, ROA: Return on 
assets, ROE: Return on equity, NIM: net interest margin, SDROA (SDROE): Standard deviation of ROA (ROE) is calculated using overlapping ROA (ROE) data 
averaged every two years, Ln(Z-score) is natural logarithm of Z-score, LAD: liquid assets to customers and short term deposits, SIZE is natural logarithm of total 
assets, NLTA: net loan to total assets, CONCE: market concentration index, GW: GDP growth rate, INF: Inflation rate, PUB: ratio of public debt to total GDP, UNE: 
unemployment rate. 
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6.2 Empirical Results 
This section discusses the estimation results regarding relationship between capital and 
profitability (risk). The study econometrically adopts fixed-effects panel regressions. 
Besides, it also presents the variability in earnings performance and riskiness of banks 
under different factors of bank categories and sizes. Finally, the robustness analysis is 
reported to check if the main hypotheses still hold under the impact of recent financial 
crisis. 
6.2.1 Effects of Bank Capital on Profitability 
 
Table 9 summarizes the regression results for the estimation results of capital and 
profitability relation derived from the fixed-effects panel regressions. Accounting 
measures of bank’s profitability (NIM, ROA and ROE) are used as the dependent 
variable. The overall R
2
 statistics for all three regression models are fairly high, 
indicating the high fitness between the model and explanatory variables.  
 
The ratio of equity-to-total assets is significantly and positively related to profitability 
ratios (NIM, ROA and ROE) at the significant level of 1%-10%. In other words, 
European banks with higher capital level generate higher profitability. Specifically, 
bank capital has strongest positive effect on return on equity, followed by return on 
assets and net interest margins. This finding is consistent with the results of Goddard et 
al. (2010), Iannotta et al (2007), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and Berger 
(1995). It is can be explained that when banks hold capital above their regulatory 
requirement, they can channel this excess capital and invest in the form of securities or 
portfolio of risky assets, and thereby earn higher profit. In addition, well-capitalized 
banks earn high creditworthiness and need to borrow less than their lower counterparts, 
thus reducing their funding cost and improve their interest margin. In general, these 
empirical results support for the hypothesis that capital improves the bank’s profitability 
around the financial crisis. This direct relationship, however, violates the literature on 
the discipline role of debt (Calomiris and Kahn 1991). As they suggest that banks with 
higher leverage will improve their assets choice and hence their profitability. Thus, 
banks with higher capital level have lower quality assets. If these assets deteriorate in 
value during crisis, banks with higher capital may suffer bigger decline in profitability 
than their lower capital counterparts.  
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NIM ROA ROE
CAPit 0.018 *** 0.027 *** 0.113 *
(0.001) (0.000) (0.099)
LADit -0.001 ** 0.000 0.022 **
(0.004) (0.476) (0.019)
NLTAit 0.012 *** 0.003 0.021
(0.000) (0.124) (0.566)
SIZEit -0.303 *** -0.084 -0.391
(0.000) (0.119) (0.704)
GWit -0.005 * 0.058 *** 0.700 ***
(0.080) (0.000) (0.000)
INFLit 0.069 *** -0.084 *** -0.716 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
CONCEit -0.000 ** -0.001 ** -0.009 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UNEit -0.025 *** -0.129 *** -1.749 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PUBit -0.007 *** -0.001 -0.004
(0.000) (0.221) (0.870)
Number of Banks 850 850 850
Observation 5950 5950 5950
R
2 0.89 0.61 0.59
Table 8: All banks – Estimation results of capital and profitability. 
Note: Dependent variable is profitability: NIM, ROA and ROE, respectively. Estimation method is Panel 
least square estimator. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-
values are in parentheses. CAP: Equity-to-total-assets, ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on equity, 
NIM: net interest margin, LAD: liquid assets to customers and short term deposits, SIZE is natural 
logarithm of total assets, NLTA: net loan to total assets, CONCE: market concentration index, GW: GDP 
growth rate, INF: Inflation rate, PUB: ratio of public debt to total GDP, UNE: unemployment rate. 
 
Other bank’s control variables also perform differently in the relation with profitability. 
The coefficient proxy for bank liquidity (LAD) indicates a significant and negative 
impact on net interest margins but positive effect on return on equity. The direct relation 
between bank capital and liquidity supports the finding of Berger (1995) as banks 
holding more liquid assets receive a favorable signal from funding markets, reducing 
their financing costs and increasing profitability. However, at some point this benefit is 
outweighed by the opportunity cost of holding such low-return assets; thereby 
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diminishing their profitability as documented by Molyneux and Thornton (1992). 
Besides, when considering this relation in the context of financial distress, it is stated 
that banks that follow more market-based rather than traditional banking model will 
earn profit as they increase liquid assets (Bordeleau and Graham 2010). The coefficient 
of the ratio of net loans to total assets (NLTA) is significantly and positively related to 
net interest margin at the significance level of 1% but it shows no significant impact on 
ROA and ROE. Specifically, banks with higher loan ratio (or potential credit risk) will 
generate higher profitability. This result implies that banks demand higher interest to 
compensate for exposure from expected and unexpected credit risk. This finding is also 
confirmed by an empirical study of Maudos and Guevara (2004).  
 
The coefficient of bank size measured by logarithm of total assets indicates a 
significantly negative association with net interest margin, but there is no evidence of its 
impact on ROA and ROE. This finding gives support to the diseconomies of scale 
existing from a level of size upwards. Namely, growing banks may face diminishing 
marginal returns on average since their profit will decline with size. This result violates 
the theory about benefit of economies of scale, as larger banks have lower costs per unit 
of income and hence higher net interest margin. It is also against the finding from 
Goddard et al. (2001) as they find that scale economies and productive efficiency in 
European banking were positively related to profits using 1989-1996 data.  
 
As illustrated in table 8, bank profitability also depends on the country-specific 
macroeconomic variables. The impact of GDP growth (GW) on ROA and ROE are 
significantly positive, but negative on NIM. The inverse relation between GDP growth 
and net interest margin is previously found by Demiguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). 
This can be explained that during period of recession characterized by lower economic 
growth, credit risks are relatively high due to lower quality of loan portfolio; hence 
banks will charge higher rates of loan to absorb unexpected shocks resulting in higher 
interest margin. However, the direct association between bank profit and economic 
growth supports the empirical results of Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011). The reason 
might be that in the period of good economic condition and well-functioning markets, 
banks are easier to identify investment opportunities, select the most profitable projects, 
facilitate trading and diversify risks; thereby improving their return on investments.  
 
Inflation also explains variation in NIM and ROE and ROA. Specifically, inflation is 
significantly associated with higher net interest margin but lower return on assets and 
return on equity at the significance level of 1%. The direct association between inflation 
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and net interest margin is simply explained as inflation entails with higher costs, which 
encourages banks charge higher loan rate to compensate, leading to higher margin. This 
result supports the findings of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). On the other hand, 
the negative impact of inflation on earnings suggests that European banks are not able to 
project the effect of inflation expectations in their cost for their investment, especially 
for banks applying modern model business rather than traditional model. Another 
noticeable finding is that market concentration is significantly and negatively related to 
bank profit, indicating banks operating in the less concentrated markets will generate 
higher profitability. Meanwhile, coefficients of other macroeconomic indicators such as 
public debt to GDP (PUB), and unemployment rate (UNE) are all significantly negative, 
indicating that unfavorable economic environment crashes profitability of the banks. 
6.2.2 Effects of Bank Capital on Riskiness 
 
Table 9 reports the empirical results about the impact of bank capital on riskiness 
derived from the fixed-effects panel regressions. Standard deviation of return on assets 
(SDROA), standard deviation of return on equity (SDROE) and natural logarithm of Z-
score (Ln (Z-score)) are used as the dependent variables. R
2
 statistics measures the level 
of fitness between model and explanatory variables. The model explains about 40-97% 
of the total variation in dependent variables of riskiness.  
 
As can be seen from the table, there is a significantly negative relation between capital 
and return volatility. Namely, well-capitalized banks with suffer less volatile on 
earnings. This finding matches with the results of Lee and Hsieh (2013), Baselga-
Pascual et al. (2013) and Konishi & Yasuda (2004).  The reason is stated that low-
capital banks respond to moral hazards incentives by increasing the riskiness of their 
loan portfolios, which results in higher non-performing loans. Meanwhile, banks 
holding higher capital will improve their loan loss provision, especially during financial 
distress in order to absorb unexpected loss and reduce volatility of earnings. Another 
important finding is that bank capital has significantly direct impact on stability as 
measured by positive coefficient of Ln (Z-score). It is obvious that safer banks will have 
lower volatility in their earnings that drives banks higher distance from insolvency. 
Overall, these empirical results confirm the hypothesis that capital reduces bank’s 
riskiness around financial crisis. 
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SDROA SDROE Ln(Z-score)
CAPit -0.009 *** -0.131 *** 0.007 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LADit 0.000 0.014 * -0.000 **
(0.239) (0.079) (0.044)
NLTAit -0.005 *** -0.076 ** 0.001 **
(0.001) (0.010) (0.040)
SIZEit -0.230 *** -2.354 *** -0.142 ***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
GWit -0.010 *** 0.041 0.005 ***
(0.005) (0.553) (0.000)
INFLit -0.011 -0.074 -0.016 ***
(0.239) (0.685) (0.000)
CONCEit -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 *
(0.853) (0.189) (0.060)
UNEit -0.011 -0.284 ** 0.011 ***
(0.112) (0.043) (0.000)
PUBit -0.000 -0.038 * -0.000 *
(0.608) (0.064) (0.070)
Number of Banks 850 850 850
Observation 5950 5950 5950
R
2 0.40 0.57 0.97
Table 9: All banks - Estimation results of capital and risk. 
Note: Dependent variable is profitability: NIM, ROA and ROE, respectively. Estimation method is Panel 
least square estimator. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-
values are in parentheses. CAP: Equity-to-total-assets, ROA: Return on assets, ROE: Return on equity, 
NIM: net interest margin, LAD: liquid assets to customers and short term deposits, SIZE is natural 
logarithm of total assets, NLTA: net loan to total assets, CONCE: market concentration index, GW: GDP 
growth rate, INF: Inflation rate, PUB: ratio of public debt to total GDP, UNE: unemployment rate. 
 
Ratio of liquid-assets-to-customer and short term deposits as a measure of bank liquidity 
has a significant and positive impact on volatility of return on equity but negative effect 
on stability. Conceptually, during credit crunch period, when banks increase the 
proportion of funds committed to cash and readily marketable assets to fund their 
operations, those liquid assets tend to yield lower returns than other investments. In 
addition, the opportunity cost of stored liquidity is higher and holding low-yielding 
assets on the balance sheet reduces bank returns; thereby increasing volatility of return 
on equity. Besides, banks suffering high earnings volatility will be less stable. This 
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finding is in line with Wagner (2007), as it is documented that an increase in asset 
liquidity in times of crisis will reduce stability. However, the negative effect of liquidity 
on stability does not have significant and economic meaning since its coefficient is 
almost zero. Surprisingly, this result is against the expectation that liquid assets are less 
risky, since liquid assets are a buffer against liquidity shocks. It also somehow violates 
the result of Altunbas et al. (2007) as they documented a strong positive relationship 
between liquidity and risk. 
 
Turning to control variable for credit risk, the ratio of net loan-to-total-assets (NLTA) 
has a significant and negative relation with return volatility but a positive association 
with stability. Namely, bank with higher loan ratio will suffer less volatile return but 
more stable. Conceptually, higher loan-to-assets ratio is accompanied with higher loan 
loss provisions, especially during crisis time, as well as low earnings. According to  
Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988), higher loan loss provision can improve earnings 
managements or reduce return volatility; thereby enhance financial soundness.  
 
Further, as indicated in table 9, the coefficients of Ln (TA) are significantly and 
negatively related to return volatility and bank’s stability as well. This result implies 
that larger banks have lower earnings fragility. It is also confirmed by Stever (2007) that 
smaller banks have fewer diversification opportunities, which drives them to make loan 
for low credit risk or more collateralized borrowers. Hence, this lower diversification 
may result in higher earnings volatility. However, DeYoung and Roland (2001) find a 
direct relation between bank sizes and return volatility. They provide empirical evidence 
that fee-based activities are associated with increased fragile earnings, indicating larger 
banks with greater reliance on non-interest incomes will suffer more volatile returns. In 
addition, as documented by Maudos and DeGuevara (2010), the financial stability is 
greater in smaller banks and decreases as their size increase, which is in line with the 
finding of this study. 
 
With respect to the macroeconomic variables, the economic cycle affects bank riskiness 
as well. As indicated from the coefficients of economic growth (GW), higher growth 
will reduce the fragility of banks’ return on assets and improve their financial 
soundness. It is easily explainable that as banking profitability is an increasing function 
of GDP growth, thereby improving stability as measured by Ln (Z-score). This finding 
matches with that of Lee and Hsieh (2013).  
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NIM ROA ROE SDROA SDROE Ln(Z-score)
Commercial banks
CAPit 0.048 *** 0.052 *** 0.288 ** -0.017 ** -0.256 *** 0.011 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000)
LADit -0.002 *** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 -0.000
(0.000) (0.327) (0.959) (0.414) (0.661) (0.345)
NLTAit 0.010 *** 0.009 ** -0.086 -0.009 ** -0.210 *** 0.001
(0.000) (0.032) (0.668) (0.016) (0.009) (0.302)
SIZEit -0.055 0.425 *** 3.630 *** -0.057 -0.150 -0.198 ***
(0.352) (0.001) (0.000) (0.645) (0.950) (0.000)
No of Observation 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512 1512
R
2 0.90 0.61 0.53 0.40 0.62 0.95
Cooperative bank
CAPit -0.005 0.101 *** 0.529 ** -0.017 *** -0.256 ** 0.086 ***
(0.663) (0.000) (0.030) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
LADit 0.002 0.000 0.026 *** 0.000 0.007 -0.000
(0.655) (0.298) (0.007) (0.395) (0.661) (0.345)
NLTAit 0.012 *** 0.002 0.043 ** -0.003 ** -0.047 *** 0.000 ***
(0.000) (0.202) (0.043) (0.052) (0.005) (0.000)
SIZEit -0.038 0.345 *** 4.769 *** -0.207 *** -2.601 *** -0.040 ***
(0.540) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No of Observation 2597 2597 2597 2597 2597 2597
R
2 0.88 0.60 0.58 0.34 0.38 0.99
Other banks
CAPit -0.001 0.019 *** 0.126 0.002 -0.097 0.043 ***
(0.826) (0.001) (0.265 (0.612) (0.172) (0.000)
LADit 0.000 0.000 0.037 ** -0.000 0.009 -0.000
(0.788) (0.261) (0.016) (0.863) (0.264) (0.155)
NLTAit 0.016 *** -0.000 0.169 *** 0.002 0.029 0.000 
(0.000) (0.838) (0.007) (0.357) (0.442) (0.809)
SIZEit -0.288 ** -0.269 *** -4.560 *** -0.389 *** -2.755 ** -0.118 ***
(0.019) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
Profitability Risk
Table 10 Bank Specializations - Estimation result of Capital, Profit and Risk. 
Note: Dependent variables are profitability (NIM, ROA and ROE) and risk (SDROA, SDROE and Ln (Z-
score). Estimation method is Panel least square with fixed effects estimator. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P – Values are in parentheses. 
 
Further, in the case of the inflation rate, its coefficient only shows a significant and 
negative impact on bank’s stability. It has to be taken into account that returns are 
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negatively related to inflation as being explained from previous section, thereby 
reducing the distance to insolvency of the banks. Surprisingly, market concentration has 
insignificant effect on bank riskiness as it only has statistically inverse impact on 
stability though the magnitude is almost zero. Meanwhile, Repullo (2004) finds a 
negative association between market concentration and bank risk since it is perceived 
that merger between banks increases market concentration and reduce banks’ 
investment in gambling assets but focuses on prudent assets. Regarding other 
macroeconomic variables such as unemployment rate (UNE) and public debt ratio 
(PUB), they are both significantly and negatively related to bank’s riskiness at the 
significance level of 5%. 
6.2.3 Effects of Bank Capital across Bank Specializations 
 
It is perceived that banks of different characteristics differ in their attitudes to managing 
capital, profits and riskiness; for instance, commercial banks will exploit their capital 
for profit maximization but cooperative focus on their stakeholder’s surplus. Therefore, 
the earnings performance and financial stability of banks vary widely from one bank 
type to another. This section will discuss the estimation results of studying the effects of 
bank capital on profitability and riskiness across different bank types, one factor 
believed to contribute to profit’s variability. Table 10 demonstrates the empirical results 
derived from the fixed-effects panel least regressions. It repeats the exercises of table 8 
and 9, but groups banks by different categories as commercial, cooperative and other 
banks. I conclude with 216 commercial banks, 371 cooperative banks and 232 other 
banks. The reported R-squared is higher for cooperative banks, followed by commercial 
banks and other banks. In order to save space, only important variables and significant 
results are reported in the table.  
 
Firstly, across three types of banks, bank capital has the strongest positive impact on 
profitability of cooperative banks, followed by commercial banks and other banks. 
Specifically, one percentage point increase in capital can raise 10.1 percentage point in 
ROA and 52.9 percentage point in ROE for cooperative banks, but only 5.2 percentage 
point in ROA and 28.8 percentage point in ROE for commercial banks; meanwhile the 
effect on profit of other banks is not remarkable. It can refer that cooperative banks gain 
more profit advantages when improving their bank capital level since they obtain more 
prudential approach to manage capital to weather the financial crisis better than 
commercial banks. Thus, it is demonstrated by their stronger effect of their capital on 
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profitability. Besides, there is a significant and positive relation between capital and net 
interest margin in only commercial banks, but insignificant association exists in the rest 
of bank categories.  
 
Other bank-specific characteristics perform differently in relation with profit. Higher 
liquid assets will improve return on equity of cooperative and other banks but 
deteriorate net interest margin of commercial banks. It indicates that commercial banks 
holding a high fraction of liquid assets have lower margin. Additionally, higher loan 
ratio also enhances NIM and ROA for commercial banks, but NIM and ROE for 
cooperative and other banks. Increasing assets size will generate higher earnings for 
commercial and cooperative banks but reduce returns for other banks. 
 
Secondly, turning to capital effect on bank’s riskiness, among different bank categories, 
the effect is stronger and more significant on earnings volatility and financial soundness 
of commercial and cooperative banks, while capital only has significant impact on 
stability of other banks. Specifically, one percentage point increase in capital can reduce 
1.7 percentage points in volatility of return on assets and 25.6 percentage points in 
volatility of return on equity for both commercial and cooperative banks. Likewise, loan 
ratio (NLTA) also has significantly negative effects on earnings fragility for commercial 
and cooperative banks but insignificant impact for other banks. Namely, higher loan 
ratio will reduce volatile earnings in commercial and cooperative banks, while the 
impact is stronger for commercial banks. Besides, size effect is significantly negative on 
profitability of cooperative banks and other banks only, indicating for these types of 
banks, increasing assets size will help them to reduce earnings volatility but make them 
less stable. 
6.2.4 Effects of Bank Capital across Bank Size 
 
This section will consider another factor which also contributes to variability of profit 
and risk among banks. The same regression models as equation (1) and (2) are 
conducted to examine the extents to which banks size associated with bank profitability 
and riskiness. Table 11 reports the estimation results regarding effects of bank capital on 
profitability and riskiness across different bank sizes. I split the banks according to the 
cut-off point that is defined earlier in this paper. I conclude with 324 large banks (2268 
observations), 107 medium banks (763 observations) and 417 small banks (2919 
observations).  
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NIM ROA ROE SDROA SDROE Ln(Z-score)
Large banks
CAPit 0.022 *** 0.090 *** 0.502 * -0.020 ** -0.592 *** 0.066 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.064) (0.025) (0.001) (0.000)
LADit -0.000 0.000 0.023 * 0.000 0.005 0.000 
(0.448) (0.163) (0.099) (0.795) (0.592) (0.882)
NLTAit 0.011 *** 0.000 0.021 -0.005 ** -0.051 0.000
(0.000) (0.765) (0.747) (0.030) (0.268) (0.557)
SIZEit -0.195 *** 0.208 ** 0.151 -0.148 ** -2.925 ** -0.076 **
(0.000) (0.019) (0.939) (0.026) (0.032) (0.018)
No of Observation 2268 2268 2268 2268 2268 2268
R
2 0.94 0.55 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.95
Medium banks
CAPit 0.003 0.053 *** -0.012 0.000 -0.196 0.061 ***
(0.879) (0.000) (0.952) (0.926) (0.154) (0.000)
LADit -0.008 ** 0.011 *** 0.088 ** 0.004 ** 0.051 ** -0.003 *** 
(0.018) (0.000) (0.016) (0.035) (0.040) (0.000)
NLTAit 0.005 0.007 0.079 -0.000 0.069 0.001
(0.431) (0.143) (0.275) (0.795) (0.161) (0.151)
SIZEit 0.270 -0.320 ** -3.147 * -0.362 *** -2.600 ** -0.201 ***
(0.155) (0.021) (0.098) (0.001) (0.044) (0.000)
No of Observation 763 763 763 763 763 763
R
2 0.71 0.87 0.72 0.46 0.51 0.99
Small banks
CAPit -0.007 0.014 *** 0.138 *** -0.010 ** -0.149 * 0.041 ***
(0.119) (0.004) (0.001) (0.029) (0.078) (0.000)
LADit -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.001 ** 0.001 0.022 -0.002 *** 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.032) (0.273) (0.271) (0.000)
NLTAit 0.014 *** 0.007 ** 0.047 ** -0.005 * -0.136 ** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.034) (0.033) (0.074) (0.010) (0.106)
SIZEit -0.282 *** -0.029 0.604 -0.239 *** -1.156 -0.133 ***
(0.000) (0.719) (0.294) (0.001) (0.398) (0.000)
No of Observation 2919 2919 2919 2919 2919 2919
R
2 0.88 0.54 0.54 0.33 0.25 0.99
Profitability Risk
Table 11: Bank Size - Estimation results of capital, profitability and risk. 
Note: Dependent variables are profitability (NIM, ROA and ROE) and risk (SDROA, SDROE and Ln (Z-
score). Estimation method is fixed-effects Panel least square estimator. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P – Values are in parentheses. 
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Coefficients of capital level are positively related to bank’s profitability across all bank 
sizes. Specifically, the capital has the strongest effect on profitability of large banks, 
followed by medium banks and small banks. In addition, increasing capital can improve 
higher return on equity rather than return on assets and net interest margin, especially in 
large banks. According to Berger and Bouwman (2013), bank capital can enhance the 
earnings performance of medium and large banks during banking crises. This finding 
matches with the results of Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and 
Goddard et al. (2004) as they confirm that bank size is linked with higher equity capital. 
It is suggesting that bank size are highly capitalized, resulting in larger banks have 
stronger effect of capital on bank’s profit. 
 
Turning to effects of other bank control variables on profitability when considering their 
assets size, they also perform differently. Bank liquidity as measured by ratio of liquid 
assets-to-customer and short term deposit has mixed effects on profit across bank sizes. 
As banks with higher liquidity only generate higher return on equity and return on assets 
in large banks and medium banks, but deteriorate earnings performance in small banks.  
In addition, liquidity has stronger effects on medium banks, followed by small banks 
and large banks. Besides, loan ratios shows a significant and positive effect on 
profitability of small banks solely and only on net interest margin of large bank but no 
evidence of its impact in medium banks.  
 
The influence of bank capital on riskiness is more significant and negative in large 
banks, followed by medium banks and small banks. It implies that capital effect on 
riskiness increases with bank size. Specifically, large banks will reduce more earnings 
volatility and enhance their financial stability more when they increase capital level. 
Interestingly, bank liquidity is directly related to earnings fragility of medium banks 
only, but no significant effect on volatility of large banks and small banks. However, it 
is significantly and negatively related to financial stability of medium and small banks. 
Meanwhile, credit risk as measured by ratio of net loan-to-total assets has stronger 
effect on volatile returns of small banks, followed by large banks but no impact on 
riskiness of medium banks. 
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6.2.5 Robustness Analysis 
 
This section presents the robustness analysis as I examine whether the main results hold 
when considering the impact of the crisis. The whole period is divided into the sub-
periods such as prior to crisis (2005-2006), during crisis (2007-2008) and after crisis 
(2009-2011). Table 12 reports the estimation results of capital effects on profitability 
and risk in three sub-periods derived from fixed-effects panel regressions. Accounting 
measures of bank’s profitability (NIM, ROA and ROE) are used as the dependent 
profitability variables and SDROA, SDROE and Ln (Z-score) are used as the dependent 
riskiness variables. The overall R
2
 statistics for all three regression models are fairly 
high, indicating the high fitness between the model and explanatory variables. 
 
Overall, only the results obtained from the post-crisis period are similar to earlier 
findings, whilst the findings during crisis and prior to crisis are slightly different. As 
shown in table 12, prior to crisis, bank capital has positive effect on ROA and ROE but 
negative impact on net interest margin. While there is no statistical evidence about the 
relationship between capital and profitability during crisis; however, after crisis, bank 
capital is significantly and positively related to profitability. An explanation is given 
that the period before financial crisis is a loose regulation time; banks are not strictly 
required to raise adequate capital or reserve for loan losses. For banks specializing in 
traditional banking, thus, increasing capital instead of making loans will lower their 
main driver of profitability or net interest margin. For banks employing modern banking 
model or specializing in market-based activities, higher capital will improve their return 
on assets and return on equity. After crisis, however, under the regime of prudent 
financial regulation, all banks are required to raise their capital, leading to positive 
effect of capital on bank profitability. The magnitude and significance of the capital 
coefficients are greater and stronger for the period after crisis with more strengthened 
capital regulations. Regarding bank-specific variables, the coefficient of credit risk is 
significantly and positively related to earnings performance before and after crisis, but 
inversely during crisis. Obviously, during the credit crunch, banks suffering higher 
credit risk will deteriorate their earnings further. Another noticeable finding is that, prior 
to and after the crisis, banks increasing their assets size will perform better but they will 
suffer lower profit in the period of crisis. 
 
Turning to capital effect on riskiness of European banks, the effect is consistent in all 
sub-periods, meaning there is consistently significant and negative association between 
capital and bank’s risk. Obviously, in all cases, higher capital will help banks buffer for 
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earnings volatility and strengthen their financial stability. It is remarkable that the 
magnitude and significance of capital effect on riskiness are stronger in the period of 
post-crisis, followed by prior to crisis and crisis time. For example, the capital 
coefficients on Ln (Z-score) in post-crisis period, prior to crisis and crisis are 0.069, 
0.043 and 0.040, respectively. Surprisingly, there is no significant relation between bank 
liquidity and bank risk before and during crisis, but positive association exists after 
crisis. Namely, banks holding higher liquid assets can increase their earnings volatility, 
leading to higher risk in post-crisis period. Besides, the coefficient of loan ratio shows a 
negative relation with returns fragility before crisis and during crisis but positive with 
stability only before crisis. Another remark is about size effect on bank’s riskiness. As 
illustrated in table 12, as banks increasing their assets size, they will suffer less risk 
during and after crisis but less stable before crisis. Specially, in the post-crisis period, 
larger banks can reduce significantly their earnings volatility as being shown by the 
negative coefficients on SDROA and SDROE (-1.159 and -9.856, respectively).  
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NIM ROA ROE SDROA SDROE Ln(Z-score)
Pre - crisis period
CAPit -0.052 *** 0.042 *** 0.269 ** -0.032 ** -0.621 ** 0.043 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.019) (0.029) (0.000)
LAD 0.000 -0.000 -0.012 0.001 0.032 -0.000 ***
(0.960) (0.713) (0.482) (0.376) (0.396) (0.000)
NLTA 0.017 *** 0.019 *** 0.196 *** -0.014 * -0.266 * 0.017 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.089) (0.015)
SIZE 0.471 *** 0.330 ** 2.354 0.006 3.399 -0.232 ***
(0.000) (0.023) (0.272) (0.978) (0.453) (0.000)
Observation 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700
R
2 0.97 0.87 0.68 0.71 0.66 0.99
Crisis period
CAPit 0.006 -0.002 0.020 -0.009 *** -0.026 0.040 ***
(0.341) (0.761) (0.766) (0.001) (0.552) (0.000)
LAD 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.183) (0.251) (0.830) (0.593) (0.897) (0.135)
NLTA 0.023 *** -0.009 *** -0.124 *** -0.002 -0.048 * -0.000
(0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.195) (0.083) (0.620)
SIZE 0.010 -0.304 ** -0.704 -0.150 ** -0.266 0.105 ***
(0.946) (0.015) (0.658) (0.036) (0.805) (0.000)
Observation 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700 1700
R
2 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.87 0.91 0.99
Post - crisis period
CAPit 0.019 *** 0.087 *** 1.045 *** -0.074 *** -0.600 *** 0.069 ***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LAD -0.001 ** 0.000 0.037 *** 0.001 ** 0.026 * 0.000
(0.024) (0.524) (0.003) (0.030) (0.087) (0.603)
NLTA 0.011 *** -0.000 -0.042 0.005 ** -0.033 0.000
(0.000) (0.891) (0.453) (0.027) (0.553) (0.858)
SIZE 0.094 0.670 *** 4.000 -1.159 *** -9.856 *** -0.037
(0.255) (0.000) (0.278) (0.000) (0.000) (0.475)
Observation 2550 2550 2550 2550 2550 2550
R
2 0.96 0.74 0.82 0.74 0.83 0.98
Profitability Risk
Table 12: All banks in sub periods – Estimation result of capital, profitability and risk. 
Note: Dependent variables are profitability (NIM, ROA and ROE) and risk (SDROA, SDROE and Ln (Z-
score). Estimation method is fixed-effects panel regression. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. P – Values are in parentheses. 
. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study examines the effects of bank capital on the bank’s profitability and riskiness 
around financial crisis period. The study analyzes a panel data comprising 850 banks in 
15 European countries over seven years (2005-2011) including Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. Fixed-effects panel regressions have been adopted for 
the model in which the relationship between bank capital and profitability (riskiness) is 
determined. The paper also examines further capital effect on earnings and riskiness as 
considering other factors about different bank categories and bank sizes. In addition, a 
robustness analysis is also conducted to verify the main results under impact of financial 
crisis. The potential contribution of this study is to provide some empirical evidences 
about the effects of capital as well as other bank-specific factors on profitability and 
riskiness of European banks around the financial crisis. Also, further classifications 
enable to answer whether different types (sizes) of banks will influence the relationship 
between bank capital and profitability (riskiness). 
 
The empirical results support the hypothesis that capital improves the bank’s 
profitability around the financial crisis. Also, this finding is consistent with the results 
of Goddard et al. (2010), Iannotta et al (2007), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and 
Berger (1995) but violates the implications from Calomiris and Kahn (1991). It is 
explained that well-capitalized banks generate higher returns from securities portfolio 
investment and higher margins from lower funding cost.  In addition, in the context of 
financial distress, there is statistical evidence that the banks focusing market-based 
activities will perform better when increasing their assets size. Furthermore, across three 
types of banks, bank capital has the strongest positive impact on profitability of 
cooperative banks, followed by commercial banks and other banks. Besides, the study 
also confirms the existence of diseconomies of scale, leading to negative association 
between bank size and net interest margin. Further, bank profitability is found to be 
positively related to economic growth but inversely to inflation rate. This finding is in 
line with the previous studies.  
 
Additionally, the hypothesis that capital reduces bank’s riskiness around financial crisis 
is also statistically proved in this study. The results imply that well-capitalized banks 
with suffer less earnings volatility, and thereby improving their financial stability. The 
influence of bank capital on riskiness is more significant and negative in large banks, 
followed by medium banks and small banks. This finding matches with the results of 
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Lee and Hsieh (2013), Baselga-Pascual et al. (2013) and Konishi & Yasuda (2004). 
Another interesting implication is that as holding higher liquid assets, banks will 
increase their earnings fragility and reduce their stability, which violates result of 
Altunbas et al. (2007). They documented a strong positive relationship between 
liquidity and risk. Besides, it is also noted that bank with higher loan ratio or credit risk 
will suffer less volatile return but more stability. The empirical results also confirm 
larger banks have lower earnings volatility and more stability.  
 
Further, after considering the financial crisis, the empirical results slightly differ from 
the benchmarks. The magnitude and significance of capital are greater and stronger on 
profitability and riskiness for the period after crisis with more strengthened capital 
regulations, while there is no statistical evidence about the relationship between capital 
and profitability during crisis. Another noticeable finding is that, prior to and after the 
crisis, banks increasing their assets size will perform better but they will suffer lower 
profit in the period of crisis. 
 
The limitations of this study are adopting only panel least squares method and using 
small samples. As this paper examines the effect of capital on bank’s profit and risk, in 
order to allow for simultaneity among them, it is advisable to use two-step system 
general method of moments dynamic panel data techniques or Zeller’s Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression approach (Lee and Hsieh 2013; Altunbas et al. ( 2007). In 
addition, due to small sample period based on data availability, the paper only focuses 
on absolute levels of profitability and risk rather than on their change as suggested by 
Berger and Bouwman (2013). Besides, for further investigation in the future, it is 
suggested considering the relation between capital level and stock price of the bank 
during financial crisis as well as stated by Akhigbe et al. (2012). 
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Author Period Countries Methodologies Results
Akhigbe et al. (2012) 2007 - 2009 US Weighted Least Squares
Banks with a higher level of capital 
experienced greater shocks during 
the financial crisis
Altunbas et al. (2007) 1992 - 2000 Europe Panel Data Model
Capital has negative impact on bank 
risk
Baselga - Pascual et al. (2013) 2005 - 2011 Europe Dynamic Panel Model
Capitalization, profitability and 
efficiency and liquidity are negatively 
and significant related to banks risk
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) 2006 - 2008 Globe Multiple regression
There is positive relation between 
Tier 1 capital and profit for large 
banks.
Berger (1995) 1983 - 1989 US Granger - Causality
Capital has significantly positive 
impact on bank profitability
Berger and Bouwman (2013) 1984 - 2009 US Logit regression & OLS
Capital increases profitability for all 
bank size but medium-size bank 
during crisis
Bertrand (2001) 1989 - 1995 Swizeland 3SLS
A positive association is found 
between changes in risk and capital
Bessler and Kurmann (2014) 1990 - 2011 Europe & US
Pooled OLS & Pooled Tobit 
Regression.
banks’ risk factors are multi-
dimensional but well-reflected in 
stock prices
Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga (2000) 1990 - 1997 Globe Panel Data Model
Profit is positively related to lagged 
equity varible.
Goddard et al. (2004) 1992 - 1998 Europe Dynamic Panel Model
The relationship between capital 
and profitability is significantly 
positive.
Innotta et al. (2007) 1999 - 2004 Europe Panel Data Model
Capital has significantly positive 
impact on bank profit and risk
Konishi and Yasuda (2004) 1990 - 1999 Japan Panel Data Model
Negative association is found 
between capital requirement level 
and bank risk
Jacques and Nigro (1997) 1990 - 1991 US 3SLS
A positive relation is found between 
changes in profit and capital but 
inverse association between capital 
and risk
Jokipii and Milne (2009) 1986 - 2006 US Panel Data Model
Banks with capital buffer 
approaching the minimum 
requirement, the relationship 
between adjustments in risk and 
capital are negative
Lee and Hsieh (2013) 1994 - 2008 Aisa Generalised Method of Moments
Effect of increasing bank capital on 
profit (risk) is significantly positive 
(negative)
Shim (2010) 1993 - 2004 US 3SLS
Capital has a positive relationship 
between profit and risk.
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) 1983 - 1987 US 3SLS
A positive relation is found between 
changes in risk and capital
APPENDIX 
 
Table 13: Summary of Empirical Results 
